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Success in ensuring a continuous, ade-
quate supply of food is one of the most im-
portant bases on which governments of low-
income countries are judged by their people.
This is because downward fluctuations in
food supplies wreak great privation on low-
income people and redistribute real income
away from them. In view of this, the Interna-
tional Food Trade and Food Security Program
at the International Food Policy Research
Institute (IFPRI) has undertaken a series of
studies of food supply management in devel-
oping countries.
Among the policies considered have been
schemes to compensate for fluctuations in
food production and supply and in foreign
exchange availability at the national, region-
al, and international levels. IFPRI's studies
of food management policies in individual
countries have included Government Policy
and Food Imports: The Case of Wheat in
Egypt, Research Report 29, by Grant M.
Scobie, and Policy Modeling of a Dual Grain
Market: The Case of Wheat in India, Re-
search Report 38, by Raj Krishna and Ajay
Chhibber. Work on food security policies
in Pakistan is under way.
The continuing difficulty in establishing
a world grain reserve suggests that such a
scheme is impractical. However, regional
cooperation may provide a viable means of
improving Third World food security. In Re-
search Report 26, Food Security in theSahel:
Variable Import Levy, Grain Reserves, and
Foreign Exchange Assistance, John Mclntire
looked at possibilities for regional coopera-
tion among the Sahelian countries.
This research report focuses on the po-
tential for improving food security among
nine Southern and Eastern African countries
that joined together in 1980 to explore re-
gional cooperation by forming the Southern
African Development Coordination Confer-
ence (SADCC). Ulrich Koester, a professor
of agricultural economics at the University
of Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany, was
asked to undertake this research because
he has spent many years studying the effects
of the food policies of the European Com-
munity. In 1982 IFPRI published his work
Policy Options for the Grain Economy of
the European Community: Implications for
Developing Countries, Research Report 35.
Because he is so thoroughly versed in the
successes and failures of the EC and other
regional cooperation schemes, he was partic-
ularly qualified to evaluate the possibilities
and pitfalls that face the SADCC countries
in pursuing regional cooperation to ensure
food security.
Koester shows that considerable savings
are possible from regional cooperation, due
substantially to the circumvention of extraor-
dinarily high transport costs that so insulate
the bulk of the countries from international
trade. However, he also points to the dif-
ficulty in obtaining cooperation on exchange
rates and other macro policies, though this
is essential if regional cooperation is to
achieve its full potential for providing food
security.
Besides the substantial research project
under way in Pakistan, IFPRI has plans for
comparative analyses of food security issues
in several other countries. When these stud-
ies are completed, a broad picture will be
available as to the varying needs for achiev-
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SUMMARY
Food security continues to be a major con-
cern in developing countries, particularly in
Africa. Despite a strong desire for autonomy,
developing countries are becoming increas-
ingly dependent on world markets for their
food supplies; they trade more with developed
countries than with each other. Moreover,
trade barriers are often a major deterrent
to intraregional trade. This report investigates
whether regional cooperation can improve
food security. It identifies the determinants
of successful cooperation schemes, and it
develops a methodology for quantifying the
potential benefits. In 1980, nine African coun-
tries agreed to join the Southern African
Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC), primarily to explore ways of be-
coming economically independent of devel-
oped countries, particularly the Republic of
South Africa. The SADCC countries, which
include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia,
and Zimbabwe, are exploring possibilities
for integration of their agricultural markets,
taking a project-oriented approach. It is hoped
that some guidelines will be provided here
for SADCC and other groups considering
regional cooperation.
A number of regional schemes have been
undertaken over the years, many of them
unsuccessful. This report examines the pit-
falls and pluses of five of them: the Euro-
pean Community (EC), the Latin American
Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Carib-
bean Community (CARICOM), the East
African Community (EAC), and the West
African Economic Community (CEAO).
The major drawback of the EC is its
tendency to increase agricultural protection,
thus thwarting its objective of ordering trade
according to each country's comparative ad-
vantage.
Results of cooperative efforts among the
developing countries have been mixed. In-
creased trade between LAFTA countries has
not developed, but prospects for growth in
food trade among the CARICOM countries
appear to be promising. The short-lived EAC
integration scheme could have been success-
ful, but national intervention and ideological
differences led to its demise. In West Africa,
a regional cooperation tax is the primary in-
strument of CEAO. This system of special
duties on intraregional trade and uneven du-
ties on other trade has undermined trade flows
within the region. The most significant ob-
stacle to all intraregional trade, however, is
the uneven distribution of costs and ben-
efits among the countries. In general, de-
veloping countries are reluctant to give UP .
national autonomy in policy planning on
critical food issues,
Based on the economic theory of inte-
gration, there are two arguments againsT
regional cooperation. First, regional cooper-
ation could detract from worldwide integra-
tion, which is seen as economically more
efficient. Second, it implies discrimination
against other possible trading partners. It is
argued" in this report, however, that the
SADCC countries are too small to have any
significant effect on international trade.
And, because there is little trade at present
among the countries of the region, efforts
to encourage trade between member coun-
tries could eventually lead to expanded trade
with other African countries.
Moreover, the potential for regional co-
operation to improve food security seems
favorable for a number of reasons. First, in
landlocked countries like those of SADCC,
the difference between import and export
parity prices for trade outside the region is
large because transport costs are high. Sec-
ond, risk pooling strategies such as stock-
holding or foreign exchange stabilization
schemes are more feasible for the region
than for the world or individual nations.
Finally, political will must be considered:
countries may be more willing to cooperate
on a regional level.
To indicate whether a country wouldbenefit from regional integration, coefficients
oY variation are used to measure fluctuations
in cereal production, creating an instability
index based on 1960-80 production data
for the SADCC countries. Each country's
share of regional production and a matrix
of the correlation between fluctuations of
the countries are also calculated. In seven
of the nine countries production fluctuates
more than 10 percent. All countries stand
to gain from regional cooperation, but the
degree Varies greatly, with Botswana gain-
injTffie"ffloSt and lanzania the least. Then,
several indexes are calculated to investigate
whether production patterns in the SADCC
countries are too much alike to afford oppor-
tunities for intraregional trade. All of these
tests clearly support the hypothesis that there
is ample potential for trade if barriers could
be removed.
When exports and imports of SADCC
countries are matched, the products with
the greatest potential for intraregional trade
are live" animals, meat, maize, vegetables,
sugar and honey, vegetable oils, and anTRTal
feeds. Intraregional trade could account for
lTpercent of total trade in agricultural prod-
V ucts, but this is probably underestimated.
Trade in maize is especially important
because white maize is preferred in the re-
gion, but only yellow maize is traded on
world markets. In a hypothetical example,
it is shown that if in 1981 Zambia imported
maize and wheat from Zimbabwe, which
had surpluses, instead of buying it on the
world market, it could have saved about
U.S. $14.5 million because of the difference
in transport costs. And this does not take
into account the premium on white maize.
The basic idea underlying the coopera-
tion approach of the SADCC countries is,
by and large, economically well-founded. Pri-
ority is placed on projects and activities that
have external effects across national boun-
daries. Among the objectives of this study
are to identify the kind of joint activities
that might be promising, what their benefits
could be, and what institutional framework
might be needed to exploit potential benefits.
The study finds that it would be most
reasonable for the region to cooperate in
risk-reducing activities because fluctuations
in cereal production, cash crop production, ]
and export earnings are smaller on the re- f
gional than national level. The countries _j
also nave at their disposal alternative strate-
gies toward achieving stabilization. First,
fluctuations in the supply of cereals among
the SADCC members could be synchronized.
Second, a regional stockpiling system for
grains is a strategy that would not require
the sacrifice of national autonomy but would
allow for increased food security. Hence,
this alternative is investigated in detail. Based
on past fluctuations in cereal production and
import prices, the amount of stocks needed
for each country'to stabilize cereal consurfip-
tien is calculated, aiidffftls is compared to
the STOCKS required by the same countries
cooperating regibhaliy. Results show that re-
gional stocks could be about 41 percent less
than tne sum or national stocks without cq^
operation.
However, national interests in such a
scheme may diverge considerably. Some
countries believe that food security is not
necessarily threatened by occasional fluctu-
ations in cereal consumption. They assume
that incomes are sufficiently high to com-
pensate for cereal price fluctuations or that
cassava consumption could be increased dur-
ing periods of cereal shortages. Other coun-
tries may consider regional stocks as a form
of insurance to which they can subscribe as
much or as little as they like. A formula is
developed here to specify the premium that
a country would have to pay according to
the amount of insurance chosen.
In general, it will be costly if stockpiling
is the only risk-reducing strategy used. In-
stead, a portfolio approach is suggested,
which, in addition to the holding of stocks,
might include strategies aimed at changing
production patterns to stabilize foreign ex- •
change earnings. Results show that there is
potential for reducing overall variability in
production and income both nationally and
regionally. A foreign exchange stabilization
scheme could also be promising.
The SADCC countries are not yet pre-
pared to exploit the full potential for intra-
regional trade among their members. Instead
they prefer to resort to counterpurchase
trade under which the value of exports mustequal the value of imports on a bilateral
basis. It is argued in this report that such
an agreement may be welfare-decreasing if
the currencies of any of the trading partners
are overvalued more than the others. There-
fore, any such transactions should be made
in international prices denominated in U.S.
dollars.
The results clearly indicate that the
SADCC countries could be better off if they
cooperated efficiently. However, to exploit
potential benefits is not only a question of
economics, it is a challenging political task.
The partner countries will need strong po-
litical will, and countries must be prepared
to give up some autonomy in designing and
implementing their domestic food policies.
Moreover, exploitation of the benefits of
comparative advantage could be achieved if
market forces were allowed to direct not
only intraregional trade flows but also trade
flows within the cooperating countries. There
is no evidence or indication that countries
are willing to take this road. Hence, it seems
reasonable to start with a more modest ap-
proach to cooperation, as the SADCC coun-
tries are doing.
11INTRODUCTION
Despite extensive efforts in recent years,
food availability in developing countries is still
inadequate. Moreover, it is highly probable
that the dependence of developing countries
on world food markets will increase in the
decade ahead, thus increasing food insecurity.
Food security has been defined as the ability
of food-deficit countries, or regions, or house-
holds within these countries to meet target
consumption levels on a year-to-year basis.
1
Consequently, food insecurity has two facets:
first, real income may be too low to provide
target consumption for all groups of the society
even in years of normal or above-normal do-
mestic production, and second, real income
may fluctuate as the result of variations in
domestic production of food and nonfood prod-
ucts or of import and export prices or both.
The purpose of this study is to explore
the potential for regional cooperation among
developing countries to improve food secu-
rity. At present, developing countries are
more integrated with developed countries
than with each other. This is especially so
in their trade patterns, monetary relations,
and credit flows. The current pattern of in-
ternational economic relations is only partly
the result of differences in comparative ad-
vantage between developed and developing
countries. Trade barriers and distortions may
also be responsible for the meager trade
among developing countries.
The need for greater cooperation among
developing countries has been widely recog-
nized by international organizations.
2 The
European Community (EC) has offered to
provide financial assistance for promoting
integration schemes. Developing countries
themselves recognize the potential for de-
velopment through cooperation, as can be
seen by the recent establishment of two
new schemes, the Southern African Develop-
ment Coordination Conference (SADCC),
which includes nine countries, and the Pref-
erential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern
African States (PTA), which includes 15
countries, 6 of which are also members of
the SADCC.
The objectives of this research are partly
general and partly specific. More specifically
the study concerns the SADCC countries,
which include Angola, Botswana, Lesotho,
Malawi,Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania,
Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Figure 1 is a map
of the SADCC countries. This cooperation
scheme was chosen because it is a new
scheme, founded in 1980, and hence is still
in a preliminary phase and conceivably open
to changes in its structure and direction.
The study first investigates the conditions
under which regional cooperation among
developing countries might contribute to food
security and delineates the fields of coopera-
tion that are most promising. Second, the
determinants of success or failure of other
cooperation schemes are examined. Third,
a methodology is developed to quantify the
effects of integration. It is hoped that the
results of these three tasks will serve as
guidelines for any future cooperation schemes
and that the information provided may also
help revitalize present schemes by changing
their focus.
To achieve the study's objectives the
report is organized as follows. The third
chapter provides information about the ap-
proach to cooperation taken by the SADCC
countries. In Chapter 4, the economic theory
of integration is examined to see if the goal
of food security is better met through regional
1 Alberto Vald6s and Ammar Siamwalla, "Introduction," in Food Security for Developing Countries, ed. Alberto
Valdes (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 2.
2 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Economic Cooperation and Integration among
Developing Countries (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1976).
12Figure 1—Map of the Southern African Development Coordination
Conference countries
or global cooperation. The determinants of
success or failure of regional cooperation
schemes are also investigated. An assess-
ment of other integration schemes and an
overview of obstacles to integration are pre-
sented in Chapter 5.
It is widely believed that developing
countries should try to make themselves
less dependent on trade with industrialized
countries, either by striving for increased
import substitution and autarky, which could
be costly, especially for the African countries,
or by increasing trade between developing
countries. Chapter 6 explores how a regional
integration scheme for the SADCC coun-
tries could contribute to stabilizing consump-
tion, to expanding trade, and thus to improv-
ing income growth and food security. The
approach chosen should be of special inter-
est to small African countries because it tests
the hypothesis of production complemen-
tarity among African countries.
Chapter 7 deals with alternative arrange-
ments for stabilizing food consumption
within the SADCC region. Regional cooper-
ation can contribute to stabilizing consump-
13tion if patterns of fluctuations in production
among basic food products (subsistence crops)
and cash crops differ among the countries
of the scheme. For instance, countries could
attempt to synchronize fluctuations in sup-
ply, thereby achieving a higher degree of
stability. However, it may be that this op-
tion, in that it requires a high degree of
harmonization of national policies, is not
politically feasible. Instead, countries could
establish a regional stockpiling system for
cereals. In finalizing this alternative, partic-
ular emphasis is given to the basic institu-
tional framework that would be required.
However, regional stocks alone are unlikely
to be an optimal solution for increased sta-
bility; first, because fluctuations in produc-
tion are exogenous and cannot be changed
through policy changes, and, second, because
the reasons for variability in overall con-
sumption may be numerous, but regional
stocks for cereals only deal with variability
in cereal consumption. To incorporate these
considerations, whether a change in pro-
duction patterns can reduce overall instabil-
ity in income is investigated. Finally, the
scope for a regional foreign exchange sta-
bilization scheme is analyzed.
14THE COOPERATION APPROACH
OF THE SADCC COUNTRIES
It is no wonder that African countries
are more prone to cooperate than countries
on other continents. As Domenico Mazzeo
claims, "Africa is a relatively balkanized con-
tinent. With only 10 percent of the world
population, Africa numbers one-third of the
countries of the world."
3 Most countries
have a population of only 5-15 million people.
Most national African markets are inadequate
to meet the requirements of modern eco-
nomic development, which is especially true
for the nine SADCC countries.
Development policies in the nine coun-
tries have, with few exceptions, promoted
agricultural and agroindustrial exports to
earn foreign exchange for development.
These policies have of necessity increased
the dualism of agriculture. A relatively few
capital-intensive commercial farms or estates
have benefited at the expense of a multitude
of small and undercapitalized farms, which
mainly produce for their immediate subsis-
tence with little or no marketable surplus.
As a consequence of past policies, SADCC
countries are increasingly less able to feed
themselves and progressively more reliant
on food imports. The rising reliance on food
imports might be acceptable if the countries
had a comparative advantage in nonfood
production, especially industrial production.
But this is not the case. Agriculture in the
region is highly important for achieving both
food self-sufficiency and foreign exchange for
investment in economic development. It
provides a livelihood for 60 percent of the
population. Hence, much of the industrial
development is in agroindustries or the pro-
cessing of local agricultural products.
A higher dependency on agricultural im-
ports hardly seems acceptable for the SADCC
countries from a political point of view, con-
sidering that the main supplier has thus far
been the Republic of South Africa (RSA).
This dependency has further opened the
door for the RSA to penetrate the economies
of the region. Hence, if the SADCC countries
want to become economically and politically
independent, they have to free themselves
from ties with the RSA. The countries hope
that regional cooperation may stimulate a
move to more independence.
In addition, there are other good argu-
ments for cooperation. The total population
of these countries was only 63.7 million in
1982 (see Table 1); that is, an average popu-
lation of 7.08 million per country. In other
parts of the world individual countries of a
similar size have felt the need for economic
cooperation. The EC is a case in point. Hence,
their small populations should be an incen-
tive for the SADCC countries to cooperate.
Of course, population size is only a crude
indicator for measuring the economic size
of a country's market. Total GDP per capita
can serve as an additional criterion. Both
indicators support the conclusion that the
economic size of these national markets is
very small and that cooperation among these
countries would certainly not create a large
trading bloc that might monopolize world
markets or adversely affect the chances for
multilateral trade liberalization.
Apart from the small size of national
markets, the SADCC countries may have
additional incentives to cooperate econom-
ically because six of the nine countries are
landlocked, and therefore, they must depend
at least in part on transport facilities in neigh-
boring countries.
Finally, economic cooperation is not al-
ways based on pure economic reasoning.
Political factors are often more important.
3 Domenico Mazzeo, "Conclusions: Problems and Prospects of Intra-African Cooperation," in African Regional
Organization, ed. Domenico Mazzeo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 225.
15Table 1—Population and GDP, total























































Source: Joseph Hanlon, SADCC: Progress, Projects,
and Prospects, The Economist Intelligence
Unit Special Report No. 182 (London: The
Economist, 1984), p. 13.
" 1982 midyear estimates.
b GDP at current factor cost.
c 1981.
d 1981 market prices.
The SADCC countries have the political will
to become less dependent on the RSA. They
were chosen for this study because their
cooperation focuses on positive policy in-
tegration, that is, emphasis has been placed
on joint activities that are ostensibly to the
advantage of all member countries. It was
not founded for the purpose of forming a
common market.
The formal foundation of the SADCC
scheme is unusual. There is no treaty where
the objectives are articulated and where the
strategy and instruments chosen are speci-
fied. Instead, there is a declaration, which
was formulated when the leaders of the nine
states first met in Lusaka in 1980 to agree
on a cooperation scheme.
In the Lusaka Declaration, SADCC set
four development objectives:
1. the reduction of economic depen-
dence, particularly, but not only, on
the Republic of South Africa;
2. the forging of links to create a genu-
ine and equitable regional integra-
tion;
3. the mobilization of resources to pro-
mote the implementation of national,
interstate and regional policies; and
4. concerted action to secure interna-
tional cooperation within the frame-
work of our strategy for economic
liberation.
4
Tables 2 and 3 indicate the direction of
trade of the SADCC countries in 1981 and
trade flows. The evidence reveals that trade
is mainly with the RSA and the countries
with which the SADCC countries formerly
had colonial ties. It is unlikely that these
trading patterns reflect comparative advan-
tages. According to Table 3, there was almost
no trade among the SADCC countries in
1981.
5 However, as distance and transport
costs are important determinants of com-
parative advantage and trade flows, a poten-
tial for increasing intra-SADCC trade seems
reasonable to assume, especially since SADCC
countries are already fairly open. Table 4
shows that exports and imports account for
63 to 95 percent of GDP for Botswana and
an average of 19 to 26 percent of GDP for
all SADCC countries. Redirection of trade
flows and possibly trade expansion seem
feasible.
The second objective emphasizes equi-
table regional integration. The SADCC leaders
are aware that unequal distribution has
been the most important cause of poor per-
formance of other integration schemes. The
form of integration chosen seems to deter-
4 Quoted in Joseph Hanlon, SADCC: Progress, Projects, and Prospects: The Trade and Investment Future of the
Southern African Development Coordination Conference, The Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report 182
(London: The Economist, 1984), p. 3.
5 The only significant intraregional trade flow is that between Tanzania and Mozambique, which is due to a
bilateral trade agreement concluded at the end of 1981. This clearly Indicates that there is a potential for
intraregional trade expansion. See W. Zehrender, Cooperation versus Integration: The Prospects of the Southern
African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) (Berlin: German Development Institute, 1983), p. 15.



























































































































































Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Quarterly Economic Review, various issues.
Note: Data for Lesotho and Swaziland were not available.
3 For Botswana, data were only available for trade destination by region.
b Southern Africa Includes Lesotho, Swaziland, and the Republic of South Africa.
c Date for Zimbabwe were from 1981.
mine whether uneven distribution will be
a problem. In general, market integration
is more likely to create uneven distributional
effects than cooperation in joint activities.
Market integration could be a concern from
a distributional point of view if the degree
of development differs significantly among
integrating countries.
Table 5 supports this concern. The level
of per capita income varies widely among
countries. In U.S. dollars, it is only $214
for Lesotho, but $802 for Botswana. Zim-
babwe, with a per capita income of $787
and 26 percent of GDP originating in man-
ufacturing, has the highest potential for ex-
panding intraregional trade in manufactured
products and is probably most attractive for
investments in industry. But, although it is
likely that distribution will be unequal given
these differences, this does not imply that
all countries will not gain in absolute terms.
The third and fourth objectives of the
Lusaka Declaration are well founded if the
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Source: Derived from Joseph Hanlon, SADCC: Progress, Projects, and Prospects, The Economist Intelligence Unit
Special Report No. 182 (London: The Economist, 1984), p. 13.
of the individual countries are taken into
consideration. First, because so many of the
SADCC countries are landlocked, coopera-
tion in developing a regional transport and
communication system seems reasonable.
Second, all countries have long borders with














































Source: Derived from Joseph Hanlon, SADCC: Prog-
ress, Projects, and Prospects, The Economist
Intelligence Unit Special Report No. 182 (Lon-
don: The Economist, 1984), p. 13.
neighboring countries. Conducting national
policies, especially price policies, without
taking policies of neighboring countries into
consideration would either lead to illegal
trade or would demand high administrative
costs for controlling border trade. Third,
cereal production is unstable in the SADCC
countries but probably less so on the re-
gional than the national level. Hence, joint
actions to stabilize cereal consumption could
be highly profitable. Finally, countries as a
group are certainly stronger in international
negotiations than the sum of the individual
countries would be. This is especially true
for attracting investment aid from developed
countries.
Whether these realistic objectives can
be achieved largely depends on the organiza-
tional framework and the strategies chosen.
The SADCC approach is also unusual in these
respects.
6 SADCC did not start by establish-
ing supranational institutions, as did most
of the older integration schemes, and so far
it has avoided this step. The supreme body
of the organization is known as the Summit.
This organization consists of heads of state
of the nine member countries. The Summit
meets once a year for a day. Its purpose is
to rededicate the support of member states
6 The description of the organizational structure is based on P. Murphy, "The SADCC Food Security Programme,"
in Executing Food and Nutrition Programmes in East, Central, and Southern Africa: Experience and Practice,
ed. F. van der Haar, proceedings of a workshop held in Harare, Zimbabwe, August 22 to September 2, 1983
(Wageningen: Netherlands International Nutrition Institute, 1983), p. 213.
19to the objectives of SADCC, to review the
progress made in achieving those objectives,
and to lay down guidelines on where em-
phasis should be placed in the SADCC pro-
grams of action for the subsequent year.
Subordinate to the Summit is the SADCC
Council of Ministers, which meets three
times each year. The first meeting is held
immediately before the Summit in order to
approve the progress report to be submitted
to the Summit. A second meeting is held
midyear to accept the progress reports from
member states who are responsible for dif-
ferent portfolios. At this meeting the Council
of Ministers also prepares for the annual
conference of SADCC leaders and represen-
tatives from donor countries. The council
meets for a third time immediately before
the annual SADCC-Donor Conference, prin-
cipally to resolve any problems that may have
arisen after the midyear meeting and before
the SADCC-Donor Conference begins.
Supporting the Council of Ministers is
the Standing Committee of Officials. This
organization consists of senior government
officials from the nine countries. The main
work of the standing committee is to re-
ceive progress reports from countries with
responsibility for different portfolios and to
prepare new proposals for inclusion in the
SADCC programs of action. Records of the
meetings of the standing committee are for-
warded to the council for approval. These
records provide the principal working docu-
ments used by the council.
The SADCC countries tried from the be-
ginning to keep the executive structure for
administering the SADCC program of action
at an absolute minimum. There is only a
small secretariat whose main function is to
make the administrative arrangements for
holding the annual summit meeting, the an-
nual SADCC-Donor Conference, and the
various meetings of the Council of Ministers
and the Standing Committee of Officials.
The responsibility of implementing the pro-
grams of action is not given to the secre-
tariat but to individual member states. Every
member state is responsible for at least one
portfolio.
The portfolios address the following eco-
nomic issues: energy development; agricul-
tural research; animal health; soil and water
conservation and land utilization; wildlife
conservation and fisheries; forestry; trans-
port and communications; industrial coordi-
nation; mining; manpower development; and
food security.
Each country is responsible for prepara-
tion of proposals for a program of action in
the sector assigned to it. The proposals are
then submitted to the council through the
standing committee and, if approved, be-
come the SADCC program of action in that
area. Each country is also required to fur-
ther the program of action in the sector for
which it is responsible and to provide reg-
ular progress reports both to the standing
committee and to the council.
SADCC's refusal to build a huge bureau-
cracy implies that the countries have not
agreed on a detailed regional development
strategy. Instead, they prefer to follow a
step-by-step process. The council sets over-
all priorities. Countries in charge of the
individual portfolios present proposals to
support those national projects that have a
regional impact. Because development of
the regional transportation system was con-
sidered first priority in the first phase, most
project proposals so far have been in this
area. There is no doubt that cooperation on
transportation is to the advantage of all coun-
tries. Moreover, improvement of the trans-
port sector may stimulate cooperation in other
sectors, especially in the food sector, be-
cause many food products are bulky and of
low value per unit.
Because an overall assessment of the
SADCC approach is not an objective of this
report, only SADCC's activities in the food
security field will be presented in detail.
The original Food Security Program consisted
of the following eight projects: to establish
and develop coordination and cooperation
on all agrarian issues; a regional early warn-
ing system; a regional resources information
system; a regional inventory of the agricul-
tural resources base; a regional food reserve;
a program to reduce regional postharvest
food loss; a more efficient food marketing
infrastructure; and regional food aid.
Principal elements of the strategy for
the achievement of SADCC's food security
20objectives are reinforcement of national
food production capacity; improvement of
the food storage, marketing, and distribu-
tion systems; development of skilled man-
power; development of intraregional trade;
establishment of systems for the prevention
of food crises; establishment of programs
for the control of major pests and diseases;
development of national food policies; and
development of institutions and mechanisms
for the exchange of information on all these
issues.
7
The SADCC countries began by approach-
ing donor countries and asking for financing
for prefeasibility studies. The principal source
of funding for operational coordination for
the period June 1982-December 1985 was
a U.S. Agency for International Development
grant of U.S. $675,000 in support of the
Regional Food Security Programme, a gen-
eral technical assistance program designed
to achieve coordination and cooperation on
all agrarian issues. By 1985, seven projects
under the Regional Food Security Programme
were being implemented with external assis-
tance. Hence, a real test of regional coopera-
tion has not been faced yet. It is easy to
cooperate if activities are financed with ex-
ternal funds, and individual countries can
only gain—never lose. Self-sustained coopera-
tion, however, inevitably implies that some
countries may lose in some areas or at least
in some years to the benefit of partner coun-
tries. Whether the individual SADCC countries
are really prepared to accept even tempo-
rary losses has not been proven yet.
SADCC's objectives and approach seem
to be realistic and well-founded, but this
does not mean that the international com-
munity should assess all aspects of this in-
tegration scheme positively. There are two
arguments against all regional market in-
tegration efforts. First, regional cooperation
could undermine the prospects for world-
wide cooperation. If global trade is considered
a realistic objective, regional cooperation
could be opposed for that reason. The EC
serves as a case in point. It is not unlikely
that liberalized trade within the EC has di-
minished the prospects for worldwide trade
liberalization. This is especially true for trade
in agricultural products. However, this reason-
ing can hardly be applied to SADCC because
of the difference in the size of the two blocs.
The total population of the SADCC coun-
tries is about the same as that of the Federal
Republic of Germany, and their economic
potential is much smaller. It is hardly con-
ceivable that the creation of such a scheme
could actually impede chances for world-
wide integration.
Second, it could be argued that coopera-
tion among the SADCC countries implies
discrimination against other neighboring
countries. If the objective is to stimulate
trade among all developing countries, regional
cooperation could be counterproductive. This
argument cannot be easily discarded. But
up to now, most African countries have not
traded with each other. It seems quite un-
realistic to expect that individual countries
could develop strong trading relations with
a large number of potential trading partners
simultaneously. Perhaps African countries
should begin trading with each other grad-
ually. Regional cooperation could serve as
a medium for this purpose: as countries gradu-
ally become open economies, they might start
to trade with countries that were not mem-
bers of the original integration scheme.
7 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Regional Food Security Programme, "Strategies to
1990," Harare, SADCC, 1985, p. 4.
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Common sense alone indicates that re-
gional cooperation among the SADCC coun-
tries could result in high economic benefits.
However, it should be clear that prospective
benefits are somewhat uncertain, and their
magnitude will depend on the selection of
specific fields of cooperation, on a proper
functioning of the scheme, and thus on how
it is implemented.
The SADCC countries are in a compara-
tively favorable position. First, they can learn
which integration strategies are more prom-
ising from the extensive literature on eco-
nomic integration. Second, they can learn
from the experiences of other countries that
have already initiated integration efforts.
This chapter focuses on the first. It investi-
gates whether the economic theory of inte-
gration offers useful guidelines for setting
up an integration strategy.
The focus of regional cooperation has
mainly been on integrating the industrial
sectors of developing countries.
8 Hence, to
deal with prospective schemes for integrating
the food economies of developing countries,
the international integration theory needs
to be modified to cope with the specifics of
the food economies in developing countries.
The first bias in economic integration
theory arises from a narrow definition of in-
tegration. Machlup points out that the term
economic integration only came into exis-
tence in 1942.
9 Until 1950 the term was
used to refer to a wide range of international
economic relations, including trade, monetary
relations, and even cooperation among na-
tions for purposes such as pollution control,




to Peter Robson, "Since 1950, the general
concept of economic integration is basically
concerned with efficiency in resource use,
with particular reference to the spatial aspect.
Necessary conditions for its fullest attain-
ment include: a) the freedom of movement
of goods and factors of production, and b)
an absence of discrimination."
1
1
This narrow definition implies that re-
gional integration is a move toward less dis-
crimination among partner countries through
border regulations. As discrimination is al-
ways the consequence of governmental
market intervention, less discrimination
stand? for less market intervention. Hence,
regional integration only asks for what has
been called "negative policy integration."
Thus, economic integration theory widely
neglects the idea that regional integration
may depend on modifications of existing in-
struments and institutions and the creation
of new ones. This is called positive policy
integration.
1
2 It is assumed here that posi-
tive policy integration, especially if the ob-
jective is to improve food security, should
be an integral part of any integration effort.
8 For a review, see Constantine V. Vaitsos, "Crisis in Regional Cooperation (Integration) Among Developing
Countries: A Survey," World Development 6 (June 1978): 719-769.
9 Fritz Machlup, A History of Thought on Economic Integration (London: Macmillan, 1977).
1
0 See Peter Robson, The Economics of International Integration, Policy Studies Institute Studies in Economics




2 See Jacques Pelkmans, "Economic Theories of Integration Revisited," Journal of Common Market Studies 18
(June 1980): 333.
22Second, in line with the narrow definition
of integration, traditional economic theory
of integration focuses on market integration
and classifies these stages of integration:
free trade area, customs union, common mar-




In a free trade area there are no tariffs
on trade among member countries, but ex-
ternal tariff rates among the countries differ.
A customs union differs from a free trade
area because there is harmonization of ex-
ternal tariff rates as well as free intraregional
trade. A common market, in addition, allows
for free movement of factors. In an eco-
nomic union all economic policies are in
harmony. In complete economic integration,
each country is equivalent to individual prov-
inces in a national state. These forms of
integration indicate a declining degree of
discrimination against partner countries. Thus
there should be no need to consider problems
of positive policy integration. But this classi-
fication is not consistent. The individual stages
not only differ in the degree of governmental
market interference, that is, negative policy
integration, but also with respect to positive
policy integration.
1
4 Whereas the first three
stages imply pure market integration, the
rest clearly imply positive policy integration.
Hence it is not reasonable to consider mar-
ket integration merely a question of nega-
tive policy integration.
To concentrate on market integration
alone may be acceptable for integration ef-
forts in developed countries, but it is less
adequate if the potential effects of integrating
developing countries' food economy are ex-
plored. It may well be that there are national
public goods, such as transport services, that
could be produced cheaper on a regional
level. There may also be regional public goods
that could be produced more cheaply if coun-
tries cooperated, but the typical integration
form classified by traditional economic inte-
gration theory may not be necessary.
Third, traditional economic integration
theory has developed as a branch of the
pure theory of international trade. Thus, it
is assumed that only real factors matter and
that private marginal costs are equal to social
marginal costs and private marginal returns
to social marginal returns. As a consequence,
it is assumed to be proven that regional
integration may have positive welfare effects




integration is labeled a second-best solution,
even if external effects and economies of scale
are considered.
1
6 Thus, Krauss concludes
that economists have failed to develop a
general argument for customs union on eco-
nomic grounds.
1
7 However, these findings
will not hold if there is a regional public
good that can be produced more cheaply
through cooperation than through either
autonomous national policies or worldwide
integration. Apart from that, traditional eco-
nomic integration theory assumes that ex-
ternal effects arise only within a country
and not across the border. It may well be
that individual countries' agricultural poli-
cies affect the outcome of the agricultural
policies of other countries much more on a
regional level than worldwide. Hence, the
best policy may be to cooperate on a re-
gional rather than a worldwide scale.
Fourth, because traditional economic in-
tegration theory identifies economies of scale
and external effects as the most promising
determinants of successful regional integra-
tion schemes, it has had much greater effect
in the industrial sector, where these deter-
minants play a more dominant role, than in
agriculture. So far, the effects of regional
cooperation on national and regional food
security have not been investigated. Perhaps
this explains why the food security objective
1
3 Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration (Homewood, 111.: Richard D. Irwin, 1961), p. 2.
1
4 Pelkmans, "Economic Theories of Integration Revisited," p. 334.
1
5 C. A. Cooper and B. F. Massell, "A New Look at Customs Union Theory," Economic Journal 75 (December
1965): 742-747.
1
6 Melvyn B. Krauss, "Recent Development in Customs Union Theory: An Interpretive Survey," Journal of
Economic Literature 10 (June 1972): 413-436.
17 Ibid., p. 434.
23is seldom mentioned as a general objective
of established integration schemes.
Finally, most of the findings of traditional
economic integration theory apply to one
specific form of integration—customs union.
However, it cannot be taken for granted
that the economic effects of the other forms,





9 The direction of wel-
fare changes may differ, as well as their
size. A free trade area might for example,
have negative welfare effects even though
a customs union had positive ones.
2
0 More-
over, the efficiency of specific integration
forms largely depends on the complemen-
tary institutional framework, which can differ
for individual integration schemes.
This short summary of some deficiencies
of traditional economic integration theory
leads to two conclusions. First, if one of the
objectives of an integration scheme is im-
provement of food security, it is not advisable
to accept the narrow definition of integra-
tion incorporated in traditional economic
integration theory. It may well be that posi-
tive policy integration could improve food
security more than negative policy integra-
tion. Focusing on positive policy integration
requires investigation of joint actions or co-
operation by a group of countries, which
could increase food security either nationally
or regionally or both. Thus, market integra-
tion, which is the only concern of traditional
economic integration, is just one of several
strategies that should be investigated.
Second, integration theory can be help-
ful in exploring the potential for positive
integration effects, but it does not indicate
whether the potential is likely to be exploited.
This depends largely on the institutional
framework that is set up. Hence, this study
considers the institutional arrangements
needed to exploit a given potential for posi-
tive integration effects and the implications
of such arrangements from regional and na-
tional points of view. The last point is of special
concern. Experience with past integration
schemes has shown that distributional ef-
fects among cooperating countries are highly
relevant for the viability of any integration
scheme.
Following this line of argument, a broad
definition of integration is used. The terms
"integration" or "cooperation" label any joint
action among partner countries that has an
impact on economic activities in the cooperat-
ing countries. This broader definition seems
especially justified for this study because
the integration scheme for the SADCC coun-
tries focuses on joint actions, whereas market
integration in the sense of the traditional
theory of integration is only seen as a future




It is assumed that one of the objectives
for integrating the food economy of develop-
ing countries is to improve food security.
Alberto Valde's and Ammar Siamwalla define
food security as "the ability of food-deficit
countries, or regions, or households within
these countries, to meet target consumption
levels on a year-to-year basis."
2
1 Conse-
quently, food insecurity may have two facets:
first, real income may be too low to provide
target consumption for all groups of the society
even in years of normal or above normal
domestic production, and second, real in-
come may fluctuate due to variations in
domestic production of food and nonfood
products or import and export prices. Inte-
grating the food economy of developing coun-
tries could contribute to both aspects of food
security.
1
8 Balassa, Theory of Economic Integration.
1
9 Actually, Dosser has argued that "standard customs union theory can be seen as a special case" (D. Dosser,
"Customs Unions, Tax Unions, Development Unions," in Modem Fiscal Issues: Essays in Honor of Carl S. Shoup,
ed. R. M. Bird and J. G. Head [Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971], p. 103).
2
0 This may be because a customs union provides a larger gain in terms of trade than a free trade area. See S.W.
Arndt, "On Discriminatory Versus Non-preferential Tariff Policies," Economic Journal 78 (December 1968):
971-979.
2
1 Valdes and Siamwalla, "Introduction."
24Income in the overall economy—not just
the farm population—could be increased
through market integration. Cooper and
Massell show quite convincingly that pref-
erential trade liberalization among selected
countries will only increase national incomes
if nonpreferential trade liberalization would
lead to even higher increases in income.
2
2
They argue that any increase in income from
regional cooperation arises solely from the
exploitation of comparative advantage. World-
wide integration—global liberalization—
would allow exploitation of differences in
comparative advantage among a larger num-
ber of countries and therefore would prob-
ably lead to higher welfare gains than regional
integration. Thus Cooper and Massell argue
that preferential trade liberalization can only
be considered a second-best alternative.
However, taking into account conditions in
African countries, preferential trade liberal-
ization may be superior to nonpreferential
or global liberalization.
Since six of the SADCC countries are
landlocked, transport costs are especially rel-
evant,
2
3 which implies a large differential
between export and import parity prices for
bulky products. Muir presents calculations
showing that the import parity price for
maize meal is more than double that of the
export parity price for landlocked Zim-
babwe.
2
4 Given such a wide price differential
between ci.f. and f.o.b. prices, the activity
becomes a nontradable, and thus by definition
the best alternative for countries might be
to pursue a policy of self-sufficiency for
major agricultural products. Unilateral trade
liberalization in agricultural products might
not affect domestic production and con-
sumption of those products if the price dif-
ferential is very high. However, if there is
preferential trade liberalization among
neighboring countries, the domestic pro-
duction and consumption patterns could be
changed in accordance with comparative
advantage.
Obviously, whether the existence of a
differential between export and import parity
prices points to preferential trade liberaliza-
tion depends on the size of the differential
and whether individual countries would
have different optimal price ratios without
nonpreferential trade liberalization. Table
6 gives some information on how price
ratios among individual countries may differ
depending on whether countries accept ex-
port or import parity prices as the relevant
opportunity cost. The data reveal that price
ratios for agricultural products would vary
widely among countries, even if free trade
were to prevail.
The free trade model applied by Cooper
and Massell does not take into account sto-
chastic elements.
2
5 Thus risk that may arise
from integrating the domestic economy into
the world economy has been neglected. This
might be acceptable if individual countries
were risk neutral. In this case, only expected
values are relevant for policy decisions, and
the deterministic free-trade model can be
applied. However, the assumption of risk
neutrality is probably more realistic for de-
veloped countries than for developing ones.
The latter are less equipped to bear risk; it
is reasonable that they value the risk element
quite highly in determining their policies.
2
6
Thus it seems rational for developing coun-
tries to prefer regional cooperation overworld-
wide integration. The risk of adjusting the
production pattern in accordance with com-
parative advantage in a region may seem
less risky than worldwide integration if coun-
2
2 C. A. Cooper and B. F. Massell, "Toward a General Theory of Customs Unions for Developing Countries,"
Journal of Political Economy 7S (October 1965): 461-476.
2
3 It was Wonnacott and Wonnacott who challenged the findings of the up-to-then well-established traditional
theory of economic integration by stressing the relevance of transport costs (P. Wonnacott and R. Wonnacott, "Is
Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs,"
American Economic Review 7\ [September 1981]: 704- 714).
2
4 K. Muir, "Crop Price and Wage Policy in the Light of Zimbabwe's National Objectives" (Ph.D. thesis, Harare,
1984).
2
5 Cooper and Massell, "Toward a General Theory of Customs Unions."
2
6 Cathy L Jabara and Robert L. Thompson, "Agricultural Comparative Advantage Under International Price
Uncertainty: The Case of Senegal," American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62 (May 1980): 188-198.
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tries feel that it is easier to cope with ad-
verse conditions in a regional scheme. This
may be true because mutual control and
reliability could be easier to achieve among
neighboring countries in a regional scheme
than in a worldwide scheme. The free-rider
problem, which is a predominant concern
for all international integration schemes, as
well as the problem of uncoordinated actions
of individual nations, are more likely to be
solved within a regional integration scheme.
H. G. Johnson and Cooper and Massell
justified the foundation for a customs union
with what was then a new argument.
2
7 They
found that customs unions could be superior
to worldwide integration if broader political
objectives were taken into account If nations
feel the need to support industrialization of
their countries by protecting their industries,
welfare losses to achieve this objective might
be less if countries cooperate than if they
pursue autonomous national policies. This
view has been generally accepted, but the
same reasoning has not been applied for
justifying regional integration of food indus-
tries among developing countries.
The arguments of Johnson and Cooper
and Massell imply that a divergence exists
between private and social marginal costs
or returns in industry. Such divergences may
also exist in agricultural production. It is
quite evident that governments, especially
governments in developing countries, give
food security high priority. Obviously, agri-
culture's contribution to GNP is taken into
account, as well as its contribution to food
supply stabilization objectives.
Arguing on the marginal cost curve in
industrial production, Johnson and Cooper
and Massell contend that a specific contri-
bution to industrialization could be achieved
more cheaply if countries were to cooperate.
The same holds true for the food security
objective on two grounds: first, as argued
above, adjusting the pattern of agricultural
production among integrating countries in
accordance with comparative advantage would
allow production of the same volume of prod-
ucts and hence would result in the same
degree of food security as without integration
but at lower costs. Second, some developing
countries aim at self-sufficiency (food secu-
rity) because they feel it is too risky to rely
on food imports under adverse conditions.
It is likely that supply will fluctuate less for
a group of countries than for individual coun-
tries. This empirical question is investigated
in more detail later in this study. If it can
be proven that production fluctuates less
regionally than nationally, integration may
help to reduce risk.
The assumption of externalities plays a
major role in economic integration theory.
However, only national externalities have
been considered. As far as food production
and food policy are concerned, externalities
may also play a role across national borders.
Take, for example, national development
projects that not only improve the national
infrastructure of the food industry in a coun-
2
7 H. G. Johnson, "An Economic Theory of Protectionism, Tariff Bargaining, and the Formation of Customs
Unions," Journal of Political Economy 73 (June 1965): 256-283; and Cooper and Massell, "Toward a General
Theory of Customs Unions."
26try but also have an impact on the food
marketing systems of neighboring countries,
such as harbor facilities and road networks
that give neighboring countries faster and
easier access to food imports in emergency
situations.
External effects of national food policies
are of special importance for relatively small
countries in Africa. Food shortages in one
country will inevitably affect the food situ-
ation in other countries because trade across
borders cannot be controlled efficiently. Thus,
coordination of policies could help to make
all countries participating in an integration
scheme better off.
Whether to create a regional cooperation
scheme is certainly not just an economic
question: it is also a matter of political con-
cern. Comparing regional schemes with
worldwide cooperation on economic grounds
alone could bring about misleading policy
recommendations. Policymakers often re-
nounce policies that are best from a purely
economic point of view because of political
constraints. A country's pattern of protec-
tion can only be explained if the political
market for protection is taken into consider-
ation. The argument for worldwide integra-
tion is mainly based on economic reasoning,
but the arguments for regional integration
are also founded on political considerations.
Political will is likely to be stronger for re-
gional than for worldwide integration. More-
over, worldwide integration reduces protec-
tion without visibly compensating producers.
Regional integration, instead, changes the
pattern of protection, helping some producers
and hurting others, and it has the potential
to improve the region's terms of trade. It
may be, therefore, that producers will be
less opposed to regional integration, making





Cooperation in risk-reducing activities
could be the main focus of regional integra-
tion schemes among developing countries.
Risk reduction is a public good that is cheaper
on the regional level than on the national,
if appropriate measures are chosen. Food
security in individual countries is impaired
from time to time because of fluctuations
in either domestic production or in import
or export prices or both. Activities to miti-
gate either the size of fluctuations, their
predictability, or their effects on production
and import or export prices imply an insur-
ance approach. Hence, the question arises
whether the premium paid by individual
countries for a specific degree of food secu-
rity would be lower if countries were to
cooperate.
Regional cooperation may be superior
to national strategies for reducing fluctu-
ations in agricultural production for two
reasons. First, fluctuations in agricultural
production are mainly caused by adverse
weather conditions, but weather is less likely
to affect production over an entire region.
If past experience supports this presump-
tion, food security could be improved through
regional cooperation.
Second, for food security, not only fluc-
tuations in production of individual crops
are relevant but also fluctuations in agricul-
tural production as a whole. However, insta-
bility in aggregate production depends on
the composition of production as well as
instability in the production of individual
crops. Individual countries might affect aggre-
gate instability by changing their production
patterns. Of course, there will probably be
a trade-off between expected income and
instability, which will be different on the
regional level than on the national. It may
be that all integrating countries would be
better off if they used a regional portfolio
approach to determine the production pattern.
Through cooperation, countries could
mitigate fluctuations in production by initi-
ating an early-warning system and by ex-
changing information on crop prospects,
actual harvests, and the amount of stocks
held. Such information could also help ra-
tionalize the trade flows of agricultural prod-
ucts within the region. Thus food crises on
a subregional level could more than likely
be avoided. Early information about the food
situation in the near future could also con-
27tribute to better timing of food imports. If
port facilities and the transportation network
are a bottleneck in coping with actual food
crises, regional cooperation in providing infor-
mation could make the constraints less bind-
ing. Moreover, supply would fluctuate less
if private or public stockpiles were avail-
able. Private stockholders are more likely
to fulfill this function, the less risky the storage
activity is. By providing early information
about the prospective market situation, gov-
ernments could make private stockholding
less risky. The amount of private stocks would
increase, and markets would be more stable.
Actually, stockpiling to even out year-to-
year fluctuations is mainly a public concern
in most developing countries and is seldom
performed by private stockholders. Coopera-
tion in building a regional food reserve system
could be a promising activity for a regional
integration scheme.
Finally, regional cooperation could be
used to cope with fluctuating export and
import prices. Two strategies could help to
achieve this objective. First, developing
countries—especially in Africa—have so far
widely neglected the use of futures markets
to reduce risk from changes in export and
import prices, perhaps because knowledge
about the functioning of futures markets is
not common. Moreover, the advantages of
futures trading may be less for small coun-
tries with risks in both production and prices
because futures markets can only reduce
risk in the latter. Regional cooperation, how-
ever, may make futures markets more prof-
itable in several ways. First, setting up a
marketing unit that carries out transactions
on futures markets may be less costly per
unit marketed for a region than for a nation.
Second, if cooperation is also used to reduce
risk in production, it will make activities on
futures markets more profitable. Futures mar-
kets could be used to stabilize, short-run fluc-
tuations in export revenue and in the import
bill and to provide a better basis for planning,
and they could also be used to rationalize
national and regional stockpiling. Futures
trading could partially substitute for stock-
piling.
It is true that futures trading is more
appropriate for evening out short-run fluc-
tuations and for improving the monthly timing
of exports and imports than for coping with
year-to-year fluctuations. A regional stabil-
ization scheme of export earnings and im-
port expenditures could be used to alleviate
long-term fluctuations. The principal idea
behind the EC's export stabilization scheme
(STABEX) and the International Monetary
Fund's Compensatory Financing Facilities
can be used to justify a regional foreign ex-
change stabilization scheme.
28OTHER REGIONAL COOPERATION SCHEMES
The SADCC countries are latecomers to eco-
nomic integration efforts. On the one hand,
they may already have forgone considerable
benefits. On the other hand, the experiences
of other integration schemes indicate that
they may confront obstacles. There is a danger
that integration efforts may fail, and integrat-
ing countries may face economic costs that
outweigh benefits. By studying past integra-
tion efforts, a new integration scheme such
as SADCC can decrease the probability of
failure and increase the chances for success.
Hence, this chapter reviews some represen-
tative integration schemes.
The European Experience
There are several good reasons for in-
cluding a short summary of the European
experience in integrating food industries.
First, the European Common Market, founded
in 1957, is the oldest integration scheme,
and it has included agriculture from the be-
ginning. The Common Market provides a
resource for realistically evaluating the costs
and benefits of such a scheme. Second, out-
side observers, especially from developing
countries, tend to rate the success of the
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) too high.
Because they are deeply concerned with food
deficits in their own countries, they are im-
pressed by the evolution of the EC from
food importer to major food exporter. It is
necessary to review critically the actual ex-
perience of the EC to gain a more realistic,
if somewhat pessimistic, perspective. Third,
the experiences of the EC may help identify
the crucial determinants of a successful inte-
gration process, that is, the political and
institutional arrangements that are decisive
for the viability of an integration scheme.
From its inception, the Common Mar-
ket's six founding members (the Federal
Republic of Germany, France, Italy, the
Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg)
agreed to include agriculture. They saw eco-
nomic integration as a process that would
eventually remove any remaining obstacles
to political integration. Rosemary Fennell
writes,. "The whole concept of the EC is
built on four freedoms: the freedom to move
goods; the freedom of workers to move; the
freedom to exercise a trade or profession;
and the freedom to move payments and
capital."
2
8 These principles could only be
achieved if all sectors of the economy were
included in the integration scheme. How-
ever, it was necessary to find a special scheme
that would be adequate for the agricultural
sectors of the member states because of the
wide differences that existed in economic
environments, policy objectives, and instru-
ments applied. Hence, integration of agri-
culture implied something more than trade
liberalization (negative policy integration);
it asked for positive integration.
The treaty of the EC was vague on the
precise nature of the CAP. It could set forth
common rules for competition, or coordinate
national market organizations, or develop a
European market organization. Eventually,
it was decided that common market organi-
zations would be established for most agri-
cultural products. Ten years after the treaty
was signed, common market regulations
were set for cereals and cereal-related prod-
ucts, such as pig meat, poultry, and eggs,
and for fruits and vegetables. Common
prices for milk and milk products and beef
and veal followed a year later.
The first decade of the EC's existence
dearly indicated that integrating agricultural
2
8 Rosemary Fennell, The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Community (Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld
Osman, 1979), p. 6.
29sectors was a very sensitive task. Only the
strong will of the member countries to achieve
a politically united Europe made it possible
to agree on common prices. Believing that
long-term benefits would compensate for
short-term welfare losses, member govern-
ments agreed to policies that seemed to be
to their disadvantage. Eventually, their com-
promises resulted in increased protection
for European agriculture. Because it was
easier for countries with low prices to agree
on higher prices than it was for high-price
countries to lower their agricultural prices,
EC prices were set higher than the average
prices prevailing in the member countries
prior to the agreement.
The Community was expected to gain
in efficiency if the agricultural sectors of the
member countries could be forced to adjust
production patterns based on comparative
advantage. However, the form of policy inte-
gration chosen tended to increase the overall
degree of protection and to make protection
rates less uniform for different agricultural
products.
When the EC expanded from six to nine
countries in 1973, the new members—the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark—
had to bear 100 percent of the adjustment
of their lower prices to EC levels, an average
increase of about 30 percent (see Table 7).
The EC never contemplated averaging the
degree of protection among old and new
members.
This tendency toward higher protection
is also the outcome of annual decisions made
by the Council of Agricultural Ministers. As
the CAP is organized, the agricultural min-
isters of the member countries are part of
the EC Council and must decide about annual
price changes for those products for which
there are market organizations. The value
of these products accounts for more than
90 percent of the total value of agricultural
production of the EC countries. Clearly, ad-
ministered price changes for those products
are of crucial importance to the incomes of
the farming population. Agricultural minis-
ters in EC countries have always been more
committed to farmers than to consumers,
and they believe that farming interests can
be better served by the EC than by individ-
ual countries. Thus, the council has been
able to increase agricultural prices more than




































































Sources: For 1966/67 and 1968/69, Odd Gulbrandsen and Assar Llndbeck, The Economics of the Agricultural
Sector (Stockholm: Arnquist and Wiksell, 1973); for 1973/74, 1979/80, and 1982/83, author's calcu-
lations based on data from European Community, Statistical Office, Yearbook of Agricultural Statistics,
1984 (Luxembourg: EUROSTAT, 1984); European Community, Statistical Office, Agricultural Prices,
1972-1983 (Luxembourg: EUROSTAT, 1984); and World Bank, Price Prospects for Major Primary
Commodities, No. 814-84 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984).
Notes: The Benelux countries are Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The first year that common
prices were in effect for the six original European Community countries was 1968/69. In 1973/74
common prices were initiated for three more countries, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark.
By 1982/83, Greece was included.
Only wheat, sugar, beef, pork, and eggs are included in these calculations.
30might have occurred on the national level.
Individual countries have accepted price in-
creases for products that they do not pro-
duce in order to win higher prices for products
that they do. This is an unavoidable by-product
of the unanimous decision rules that prevail
in the council.
This price-escalating process lasted for
nearly the first decade of CAP without violat-
ing budget constraints. During that time the
EC was still a net importer on major agricul-
tural markets. Hence, price increases that
widened the gap between EC and world
market prices affected the revenue from levies
(EC border taxes) and could reduce expen-
ditures for market support.
It is clear that this tendency to increase
agricultural protection has countermanded
the EC's objective of adjusting agriculture
according to comparative advantage. The
same forces have also caused protection
among agricultural products to be less uni-
form. Protection has increased more for
products that are mainly produced in the
northern part of the EC, such as cereals,
milk, beef and veal, and sugar beets, and
less for southern products, such as fruits
and vegetables, partly because it is less fea-
sible and more costly to intervene in mar-
kets for the latter products. The southern
countries may gain from an increase in their
milk production, even though they have a
clear comparative advantage in the produc-
tion of fruits and vegetables. Thus, the bur-
den of financing the CAP, particularly the
escalating agricultural protection, has wid-
ened differences rather than improving po-
litical unity.
This is the rationale for the CAP'S common
financing: the CAP is a European public good,
which serves the interests of both European
farmers and consumers, and therefore it
should be financed by European taxpayers.
In actuality, consumers in food-importing
member countries pay high food prices to
the benefit of producers in food-exporting
countries, which implies an income transfer
from the importing to the exporting coun-
tries.
2
9 Balance-of-payments effects go in the
same direction as transfer flows, but they
may be even more of a problem because
changes in common prices for individual
commodities can affect the individual coun-
try's transfer position significantly. A coun-
try can lose in average net transfers but gain
in marginal changes.
3
0 Thus, the institutional
arrangement has caused national interests
to conflict even more than is natural given
national economic circumstances and policy
preferences. The annual decisions of the
Council of Agricultural Ministers have rarely
been consistent with EC welfare, but in-
stead they have been a compromise of diver-
gent national interests.
The common financing system has had
another negative effect. From the national
point of view, it generally pays to increase
agricultural production, but not from the
EC's viewpoint. The EC finances disposal
of surpluses, but the benefits of production
growth accrue to the member countries. It
is no wonder that individual countries con-
tinue to stimulate production growth while
the EC is having serious problems financing
the surpluses. It is important to note, how-
ever, that these divergent interests are not
the consequence of surplus production but
of protectionism and the common financial
system.
The experience of the CAP reveals the
importance of coordinating national mone-
tary policies and paying attention to the
linkages between monetary and agricul-
tural policy. If a single administered agricul-
tural price level is established to prevail for
all member countries, real agricultural pro-
ducer prices and food prices will differ con-
siderably if the rate of inflation varies widely
among those countries. Thus, equal nomi-
nal administered farm prices will have un-
equal effects on the income of the farm pop-
ulation and on the welfare of consumers.
As agricultural ministers in Europe are con-
cerned primarily with the real income of
2
9 Ulrich Koester, "The Redistributional Effects of the Common Agricultural Financial System," European Review
of Agricultural Economics (Ho. 4, 1977): 321-345.
3
0 This is analogous to the situation of a private company. The company may run at an overall loss, but certain
marginal activities may be profitable and may help to reduce the loss.
31farmers, the member countries' demand to
increase common prices will differ more,
the higher the variance in the national rates
of inflation. Furthermore, these conditions
act against the objective of adjusting the
agricultural production pattern of the com-
munity according to comparative advan-
tage.
Divergent monetary developments among
the member countries will either require a
periodic realignment of exchange rates or
they will eventually lead to an equalization
of national rates of inflation. The Commun-
ity's choice of the first alternative has had
significant implications for the functioning
of the CAP. First, a differential between spot
and futures exchange rates normally arises
prior to an expected realignment in the ex-
change rates, which in turn gives rise to a
monetarily induced distortion in agricultural
trade flows among member countries. Sec-
ond, realignment of exchange rates has direct
implications for administered farm prices if
national markets are expected to remain uni-
fied. Countries that devalue their currency
have to accept an increase in farm prices,
whereas countries that revalue have to lower
farm prices. Thus, the change in national
farm prices is strongly determined by ex-
change rate variations. If a system of flexible
or floating exchange rates prevails, farm
prices must also be flexible in order to en-
force agricultural market unity.
When the European Common Market
introduced unified prices in 1967, it was
hoped that a system of fixed exchange rates
among the member countries would prevail
indefinitely. However, an exchange rate re-
alignment became necessary as early as 1969
and has many times since. Governments
have preferred to protect their farmers from
price fluctuations through revaluation of their
domestic currencies and to protect their con-
sumers through devaluations of the same.
As a result, monetary compensatory amounts
were introduced in 1969, which have driven
wedges between the national agricultural
prices of member countries. Thus, a true
common market in Europe can be said to
have lasted no longer than two years, and
indeed farm prices among member coun-
tries have differed more in recent years than
in the first few years of the EC's existence.
3'
The experience of the EC indicates that
integrating agricultural markets among a
group of countries is only likely to succeed
if there is either monetary unification or if
member countries are willing to subsume
their national interests to the interests of
the community by adhering to common agri-
cultural prices. However, as both agricul-
tural policy and monetary policy are sensitive
areas, it is unlikely that integration of the
food sector will be successful.
Thus, integrating the food sectors of sev-
eral countries implies that there will be policy
integration and that policy decisions will be
made at a supranational level. The EC's ex-
perience shows that the viability of the inte-
gration scheme depends largely on what
decisions are made on the supranational
level, how often, and by what process.
The pressure of policy decisions on prices
and incomes can be avoided only if the policy
activities integrated are those where national
interests do not diverge widely and if dis-
cretionary policy decisions are replaced by
well-defined rules agreed upon in advance.
Conflicts in national interests are un-
avoidable whenever decisions are made by
a multinational body. However, the outcome
of the decision is affected by the way that
decision comes about. The EC applies the
unanimity rule to any decision that may con-
flict with essential national interests of any
member country, and these are typically
inconsistent with the Community's welfare.
Bearing in mind that most of these deci-
sions, at least those in agriculture, concern
price policies, it would indeed be unreason-
able to apply the majority rule as considered
by the Treaty of Rome because it is likely
to violate the interests of specific member
countries and to make membership too costly
for them. However, it would not be unreason-
able if the guidelines for common financing
were changed and if a conscious effort were
made to avoid employing price policies that
3
1 Ulrich Koester, "The Role of the CAP in the Process of European Integration," European Review of Agricultural
Economics 11 (No. 2, 1984): 129140.
32pursue national agricultural income objec-
tives. If it is agreed that the application of
the majority rule would better serve the
general objectives of an integration scheme
than would the unanimity rule, the Com-
munity should be freed from decisions
about those areas in which national inter-
ests diverge widely.
One last point should be made concern-
ing the timing of the integration process.
The European experience has shown that
timing is important both in starting the
scheme and in its progress and development.
By definition, the integration process involves
structural changes within the participating
countries, which are bound to exert pres-
sure on some economic sectors and groups
of people. The immediate burden of this
adjustment can be minimized and thus more
readily accepted if it is smooth and gradual.
When the EC abolished tariffs for inter-
nal trade in industrial and agricultural prod-
ucts in the 1960s, French industry and the
German farm sector bore the greatest burden
of adjustment. Because a healthy economic
environment with high growth rates existed
in both economies, they adjusted without
suffering either an increase in the rate of
unemployment or undue social hardship.
However, this was not the case when the
United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark
entered the Community. The economic
adjustments to a series of oil price hikes and
worldwide recession were compounded by
the imposition on these economies of much
higher EC prices for agricultural products,
thereby fueling inflation. Unfortunately, the
public was not able to separate the causes
and effects of these different factors and prob-
ably attributed sharp increases in food prices
to the CAP. This would explain why public
opinion in the newly joined countries, espe-
cially in the United Kingdom, was much
less in favor of membership in the EC than
was the case with the original member coun-
tries. It seems obvious that conditions for
the timing of the first enlargement of the
Community were not favorable.
The EC was well-advised to allow integrat-
ing economies a transitional period whereby
the rules set forth in the treaty could be
adopted gradually. The time span for a tran-
sitional period should be determined by the
general economic environment of each in-
dividual country and the degree of adjustment
required.
In summary, the EC experience in in-
tegrating the agricultural sectors of its mem-
ber countries has not been completely suc-
cessful. Indeed, as Balassa has suggested,
"It may perhaps be said that the single great-
est achievement of the European Common
Market has been that it has survived."
3
2
This is especially true for the CAP. Never-
theless, the experiences of the EC can serve
as a guide for establishing new integration
schemes in developing countries. The first




SADCC policymakers can probably learn
the most from studying the experiences of
other developing countries. Although they
may be interested in assessing all of the
developing-country schemes that have oper-
ated during the last three decades, there
are far too many to give a detailed perfor-
mance record of each in this report. More-
over, even though each scheme has some
unique aspects, the main determinants of
success do not differ greatly among the
schemes. Therefore, detailed assessments
are given of only four schemes: the Latin
American Free Trade Association (LAFTA),
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), the
East African Community (EAC),and the West
African Community (CEAO).
LAFTA
Created in 1960, LAFTA is one of the
oldest schemes. Member countries include
3
2 Bela Balassa, "Introduction: the Common Market Experience," in European Economic Integration, ed. Bela
Balassa (Oxford: North-Holland, 1975), p. 9.
33Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. LAFTA's experiences should
be of special interest to the SADCC coun-
tries, because LAFTA has focused completely
on trade liberalization.
In Table 8, three-year averages show
that trade in agricultural commodities be-
tween LAFTA countries expanded signifi-
cantly between 1962-64 and 1977-79. How-
ever, growth rates of different products varied
considerably. Trade in fruits and vegetables
increased the most in absolute terms, reach-
ing their highest point in 1977-79. Trade
in cereals was most important in 1962-64,
but it grew by only 2.1 percent ayear. Growth
rates were remarkable for vegetable oils,
with a 16.7 percent annual increase, and oil-
seeds, with a 21.6 percent annual increase.
Data presented in Table 8 are not suit-
able for assessing the impact of LAFTA on
trade expansion because it is not known
how trade would have developed if LAFTA
had not been created. If liberalization of
trade among LAFTA members contributed
to growth of overall trade, intra-LAFTA trade
should have performed better than LAFTA
trade with the world and with other develop-
ing countries.
3
3 To test this hypothesis, a
market share analysis was applied to data
on 49 agricultural products exported from
and imported by LAFTA countries during
the period 1962-64 to 1977-79.
First, the market share analysis was de-
signed to determine how LAFTA's exports
to LAFTA member countries fared in com-
parison with LAFTA's imports from the world
as a whole and from other developing coun-
tries.
3
4 This is called the import growth effect
Second, the analysis examines LAFTA's
imports and exports by commodity groups
and individual commodities to see if LAFTA's
exports to LAFTA countries expanded as
much as LAFTA's imports of these com-
modities from the world and from other
developing countries. This is called the
commodity composition effect
Finally, it analyzes what share of the
market LAFTA exporters would have cap-
tured if it is assumed that they started out
with the same share of the LAFTA market
as world and developing-country exporters.
This is the competitive effect.
The calculations in the Appendix, Tables
28 and 29, indicate that: first, LAFTA exports
to LAFTA countries would have been con-
siderably higher in 1977-79 if they had main-
tained their 1962-64 market share of LAFTA's
exports. Moreover, LAFTA exporters could
not even increase their total exports to LAFTA
countries relative to other developing coun-
tries. Second, the loss of market shares by
LAFTA exports does not reflect a lack of
export potential because LAFTA countries
exported significant shares of goods to coun-
tries that were not LAFTA members. Third,
the commodity composition effect indicates
that intra-LAFTA exports performed better
compared with the exports of developing
countries than with world exports. Fourth,
most striking is LAFTA's loss of competi-
tiveness for total agricultural products in 11
out of 21 markets, compared with other
developing-country exports. LAFTA export-
ing countries were more competitive in
only a few markets, mainly in oilseeds.
Thus, based on these calculations, one
must conclude that the LAFTA trade agree-




creation of a free trade area does not neces-
sarily mean that such trade will increase.
What were the obstacles? Unfortunately, it
is not possible to give a complete answer
3
3 Actually, this is a necessary but not sufficient condition, because other factors, such as increased protection of
other trading partners or slower economic growth rates in other parts of the world may have contributed to
increased intra-LAFTA trade.
3
4 This approach is based on earlier works by Barend DeVries, Stephen Magee, Vittorio Corbin and Oil Havrylyshyn,
and more recently Alberto Vald£s. See Alberto Vald£s, "Trade in Agricultural Products Between Developing
Countries: Latin America Exports During 1962-1979," Materte Prime 3 (June 1984).
3
5 Brada and Mendez found that neither LAFTA nor the Andean Pact has had any effect on trade between their
members. See J. C. Brada and J. A. Mendez, "Regional Economic Integration and the Volume of Intra-Regional
Trade: A Comparison of Developed and Developing Country Experience," Kylos 36 (No. 4, 1983): 589-603.







































































































































Source: Author's calculations based on data from International Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC Trade
Data Base," Washington, D.C., 1985 (computer printout).
without presenting commodity-by-commodity
market analysis. Several hypotheses may be
considered, however.
First, it could be that intraregional trade
in agricultural commodities did not increase
adequately because LAFTA countries focused
their development policy on industry and
neglected promotion of agricultural produc-
tion. Although it may be true that agricul-
tural production would have grown much
more if actively supported by government
policies, this does not explain the poor intra-
LAFTA export performance. The data pre-
sented in the Appendix, Table 30, shows
that exportable surpluses were available be-
cause LAFTA exporting countries did export
increasing quantities to other regions.
Second, was it the importing countries'
unwillingness to import from partner coun-
tries or was it the exporting countries' unwill-
ingness to export to partner countries that
stifled trade? A free trade area implies dis-
crimination against the exports of nonmember
countries and easier access to partner coun-
tries' markets. It seems likely that importing
member countries would prefer to import
from partner countries because of the for-
eign exchange constraint. Imports from
nonmember countries generally have to be
paid in hard currencies, but those from part-
ner countries may be paid in soft currencies.
Consequently, exporting member countries
with foreign exchange constraints would
probably prefer to export to nonmember
countries in order to receive payment in
hard currencies. This could be one reason
for LAFTA's poor trade performance. But,
if LAFTA importers received easier credit
from nonmember countries they may have
preferred to import from them.
Third, positive integration among LAFTA
countries probably progressed less than ex-
pected because developing countries are
basically "policy takers" vis-a-vis industrial
countries. They react to policy changes in
industrial countries, which leaves them little
room to maneuver.
Finally, it should be pointed out that
trade between member countries could have
increased even with the given production
35pattern, but it did not materialize. Actual
integration of markets should lead to an
adjustment in the pattern of production and
consumption, thus stimulating trade among
member countries. The poor performance
here indicates that specialization among the
LAFTA countries did not develop.
CARICOM
CARICOM, created in 1973, has replaced
and extended the work of the Caribbean
Free Trade Association (CARIFTA), which
was established in January 1967.
3
6 The
change in name indicates that CARICOM
is expected to reach a higher stage of inte-
gration than CARIFTA. The treaty establish-
ing CARICOM calls it a "Caribbean Common
Market."
3
7 The treaty also specifies the objec-
tives of this common market as the strength-
ening, coordination, and regulation of
economic and trade relations among mem-
ber states in order to promote harmonious
and balanced development, and the sustained
expansion and continuing integration of
economic activities, the benefits of which
are to be equally shared, taking into account
the need to provide special opportunities
for less-developed countries. Thus, the treaty
clearly states that positive policy integration
is envisaged, as well as negative.
CARICOM's development strategy for
the Caribbean includes a regional food and
nutrition strategy. The major problems con-
cerning food security are perceived to be in
the area of production and marketing. Con-
sequently, die food strategy, which has been
agreed on at the CARICOM level but is to
be carried out largely by individual member
countries, encompasses a wide variety of
instruments. These include adjustments of
consumption patterns to potential supply,
activities to promote inputs, and improve-
ments in processing infrastructure, in the
transportation system for food commodi-
ties, in the facilities available to small trad-
ers, and in regulations affecting trade in
agricultural commodities, and establish-
ment of effective market information sys-
tems. All these activities can be considered
trade-supporting devices. Certainly, their
implementation will require time, and trade
flows to date can only partly reflect the ef-
ficiency of these strategies. But, because
their attitude toward intra-CARICOM trade
in agricultural commodities has been so pos-
itive, their trade performance is of interest.
In a study of the export performances of
the four CARICOM members for which the
most comprehensive trade data are available—
Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and
Tobago—Bennett finds that food products
constitute the most important items traded
by these countries regionally.
3
8 Food exports
increased at an annual rate of 19.5 percent
between 1969 and 1976. In investigating
whether this growth in food exports was
due to regional preference, he applies a par-
tial market share analysis model. By com-
paring actual exports to member countries
with hypothetical exports that might have
materialized if exporting CARICOM coun-
tries had held the same share of imports as
in the year 1976, he identifies export changes
from regional preference. Table 31, in the
Appendix, presents the results of his calcu-
lations. Surprisingly, preference-induced
exports of agricultural products were gen-
erally high; moreover, they were comparable
with export growth for nonagricultural prod-
ucts. Hence, he concludes that the potential
for growth in agricultural trade is high, and
schemes that concentrate on trade in non-
agricultural products may not be advisable.
East African Community
The East African Community (EAC),
formed in 1967 by Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania, aimed to set up a common mar-
ket. It ceased functioning in 1977. Although
this integration scheme was shortlived, it
3
6 Twelve countries are members of CARICOM, including Antigua, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent-Grenadines, and Trinidad-Tobago.
3
7 See Caribbean Community, Regional Food and Nutrition Strategy, vol. 1, Policy Statement for the 1980s
(Georgetown, Guyana: Caribbean Community Secretariat, 1982).
3
8 Karl M. Bennett, "An Evaluation of the Contribution of CARICOM to Intra-Regional Caribbean Trade," Social
and Economic Studies 31 (No. 1, 1982): 74-88.
36serves as a model for integrating the econ-
omies of smaller African countries. A short
analysis of its performance and reasons for
its breakdown can help to identify important
determinants of success or failure of inte-
gration schemes.
The history of the three countries seemed
favorable for an integration scheme. Under
British colonial rule, the three were united
in a customs union. They had a common tax
collection service and operated joint rail,
airport, postal, and telecommunication ser-
vices.
3
9 There was even monetary coopera-
tion. When the countries became indepen-
dent in the early 1960s, it seemed logical
to strengthen the union through the formation
of an East African Community. The integra-
tion scheme intended to set up a common
market and to harmonize national agricul-
tural policies.
4
0 Article 14 of the Commun-
ity's treaty states that the "Common Market
should extend to agriculture and trade in
agriculture."
4
1 However, the general prin-
ciple of tariff-free, intracommunity trade was
broken for the most important agricultural
products; maize, wheat, rice, raw coffee
beans, meat, milk, and sorghum were ex-
cluded.
4
2 It was argued that basic food prod-
ucts and major export products should be
excluded from free intraregional trade be-
cause the individual countries managed spe-
cial marketing institutions (boards) for these
products and set official prices in accordance
with domestic policy objectives. Intracom-
munity trade in agricultural products de-
creased in importance thereafter.
4
3
The following example characterizes
the situation concerning agricultural trade.
In June and July 1961 there was a serious
food shortage in Kenya and Tanzania, but a
maize surplus in Uganda. The Kenya Maize
Board tried to import from Uganda, but the
Ugandan Trade Ministry was reluctant to
offer export licenses. By the time it did, the
Kenyan Maize Board had already imported
more expensive maize from overseas. Kenya
then refused to grant import licenses be-
cause additional imports of relatively cheap
maize would have depressed market prices,
and the Board would have experienced a




Contrary to what some authors believe,
the contraction of trade is more likely to
have arisen from restrictions than from a
lack of trading potential because of differ-
ences in comparative advantage.
4
5 Differ-
ences in the stability of cereal production
among the three countries may have given
rise to trade flows even without specialization
of production. Whereas cereal production
fluctuated only 6.4 percent on the community
level for the period 1960-80, it fluctuated
9-10.8 percent in individual countries.
4
6
Hence, trade among the partner countries
would have stabilized cereal consumption
considerably. If countries did not choose to
trade, it was not for lack of trading oppor-
tunities.
Trade-eroding interventions appear to
be the culprit in the demise of the EAC;
domestic agricultural trade was highly regu-
lated, parastatal trade organizations played
a major role, and economic systems varied
widely. Some countries were more market
oriented and others more oriented to social
planning. These ideological differences con-
tributed to the final collapse of the EAC,
3
9 See Harold K. Jacobson and Dudan Sidjanski, "Regional Pattern of Economic Cooperation," in Comparative
Regional Systems. West and East Europe, North America, The Middle East, and Developing Countries, ed. Werner
J. Feld and Gavin Boyd (New York: Pergamon Press, 1979), p. 85.
4
0 Gunther Friedrich, "Gemeinsamer Markt in Ostafrika und Zentralamerika ein Vergleich," Beihestezu Verssasung
und Recht in Ubersees (No. 6, 1975), p. 119.
4
1 Quoted by Adolf Weber and Thomas T. Hartmann in "A Comparative Study of Economic Integration with
Special Reference to Agricultural Policy in the East African Community," Festschrift fiter auslaendische Land-
wirtschaft\5 (No. 2, 1976): 110.
4
2 See Friedrich, "Gemeinsamer Markt in Ostafrika und Zentralamerika," p. 117.
4
3 Weber and Hartmann, "Comparative Study of Economic Integration," p. 119.
4
4 Friedrich, "Gemeinsamer Markt in Ostafrika und Zentralamerika," p. 119.
4
5 Weber and Hartmann, "Comparative Study of Economic Integration," p. 120.
4
6 Ulrich Koester, "Regional Cooperation among Developing Countries to Improve Food Security," Quarterly
Journal of International Agriculture 23 (No. 2, 1984): 105.
37although they were not the only cause.
Ravenhill identifies five principal reasons
for the breakdown: different economic con-
ditions at the start, poor institutional infra-
structure, imbalances in capturing integration
benefits, different external trade relation-
ships, and ideological divergences and polit-
ical volatility.
4
7 The uneven distribution of
benefits has often been identified as the
most important factor. Actually, it is this
aspect that has been a dominant factor in
the failure of many integration efforts in
developing countries.
West African Economic Community
The West African Economic Commun-
ity (CEAO) is an old scheme that has had a
peculiar evolution. CEAO is the successor
of the Customs Union of West African Coun-
tries, which was established in 1959 by the
Ivory Coast, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal,
and Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso). A new
convention was signed in 1966, and the
present name was adopted in 1970. The
CEAO treaty was activated in January 1974.
Its declared objective is to promote balanced
economic development of member states with
a view to improving living standards as quickly
as possible. According to the treaty, "The
instruments for achieving this general ob-
jective are to be active policies of cooperation
in a variety of policy areas including steps to
develop trade in agricultural and industrial
production on an organized basis."
4
8 A pref-
erential import duty regime, termed the re-
gional cooperation tax (TCR), was instituted
as the primary instrument. As Peter Robson
describes it, "The level of the TCR is sep-
arately determined for each enterprise, prod-
uct, and country by the Council of Minis-
ters, and that body only considers applications
that are put forward by the government of
the country in which the enterprise seeking
TCR status is domiciled."
4
9
How such a system could affect the al-
locative efficiency of market integration can
be shown. A system of special duties on
intraregional trade and uneven duties on
extraregional trade is likely to undermine
intraregional trade flows. This will occur if
the price level in each country is deter-
mined by the supply price of countries out-
side the region, and if the domestic price
increased by the TCR rate of one country
is greater than the domestic price in the
partner country.
Hypothetically, import prices from non-
member countries would almost always be
lower than import prices from partner coun-
tries. But there would be a few exceptions.
In these cases transport costs would proba-
bly discourage trade flows because the
countries are not neighbors.
Of course, such calculations do not rule
out all possibility of intraregional trade in
these products. Some external tariffs could
be redundant as the countries become self-
sufficient or even exporters. Or transport
costs could make intraregional supply cheaper
than extraregional supply, even with lower
tariffs for the latter. Nevertheless, institu-
tional arrangements to avoid undesired dis-
tributional effects can completely counteract
market integration.
Obstacles to Integration
The experiences of developing countries
in integrating their food economies have
been somewhat different from those of the
EC. Nevertheless, there are common causes
for the often disappointing progress in these
schemes. The EC started with a high degree
of formal integration but had to postpone
actual progress in integrating the food econ-
omies of the member countries two years
after the formal integration agreement was
concluded. Most developing countries'
schemes were intended to promote actual
4
7 John Ravenhill, "Regional Integration and Development in Africa: Lessons from the East African Community,"
Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 27 (No. 3, 1979): 227-246.
4
8 Quoted in Peter Robson, Integration, Development, and Equity: Economic Integration in West Africa (London:
George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 42.
4
9 Ibid, p. 45.
38integration but have not succeeded because
of divergences in national interests, as the
result of differences in policy objectives and
economic and political environments in the
countries. In every country that belongs to
an integration scheme the government inter
venes significantly in the economy. Coun-
tries have felt the need to achieve policy
objectives and to remain autonomous in de-
signing their food policies, rather than
accepting the rules of a regional integration
scheme. Conflicts of interest are partly due
to variations in the design of overall eco-
nomic policy and partly to the specifics of
national food policies.
The economic and political systems in
developing countries range from the com-
pletely market-oriented economies to the
centrally planned socialist economies. It is
quite obvious that such a mixture does not
favor agricultural trade liberalization among
countries. A centrally planned economy im-
plies that the government will at least set
official prices on markets and control pro-
duction. Opening up the borders would
weaken the central planning authority. More-
over, uncoordinated central planning in some
integrating countries is not feasible. Hence, a
strong commitment to central planning acts
against integration of national markets.
Planning elements dominate develop-
ing countries' food policy. Most govern-
ments intervene in agricultural markets in
order to achieve food policy objectives. In
addition, they may intervene because of
budgetary needs. Export taxes on agricul-
tural export crops are a special case in point.
If agricultural price policy is considered the
most important instrument for achieving
policy objectives, it is likely that optimal
prices will differ from country to country.
Liberalized intraregional trade is not com-
patible with autonomous national price pol-
icies; it seeks to coordinate and equalize
national prices. However, these equalized
prices cannot serve all national policy objec-
tives equally well, because objectives may
differ as well as the opportunity costs for
achieving these objectives.
A major reason that integration efforts
have been only marginally positive or neg-
ative is the general inefficiency of economic
policies in developing countries. Integration
will only function if specific policy instru-
ments are applied. If they are not, integration
may be as ineffective as any other measure.
In addition to harmony in food policies,
free trade in agricultural products within a
region demands harmony in monetary and
exchange rate policies. If governments inter-
vene in the foreign exchange market—as is
done in most developing countries—prices
for foreign exchange are distorted. Coun-
tries may therefore be reluctant to accept
partner countries' currencies in exchange
for their products. The greater the over-
valuation of currencies within a specific in-
tegration scheme, the more this concern is
justified, especially if monetary policy varies
greatly among the member countries.
The bias in development policy in most
developing countries is a special obstacle.
Countries most emphasize development of
their industrial sectors, often at a cost to
agriculture. Agricultural prices may vary con-
siderably among neighboring countries. If
countries were to open their borders for
liberalized intraregional trade, they would
not be allowed to tax agriculture differently
than partner countries. However, the loss
in achievement of development objectives—
promotion of industry—will vary from country
to country. From this viewpoint, countries'
unwillingness to liberalize intraregional agri-
cultural trade may be understandable.
Again, the reasons mentioned so far for
the reluctance of developing countries to
free intraregional trade can be summarized
in one specific effect of trade liberalization—
the uneven distribution of benefits and costs
among partner countries. The more devel-
oped the country, the more it probably stands
to gain from the enlargement of markets.
The concern about uneven distributional ef-
fects has led some integration schemes to
make specific institutional arrangements to
avoid unwanted distributional effects. Unfor-
tunately, these arrangements can also have
detrimental effects on efficiency.
Negative policy integration—reduction
of trade barriers for intraregional trade—
will most likely not be sufficient to promote
intraregional trade in agricultural products.
Apart from necessary food and monetary
39policy harmonization, marketing infrastruc-
ture should be improved. Coordinating
policies possibly contributes more to intra-
regional trade promotion than reducing trade
barriers.
Finally, political tensions among partner
countries or animosities between political
leaders have contributed to the slow prog-
ress of some integration schemes or have
even led to the suspension of a scheme, as
in the case of the EAC.
This short review of the experiences of
some older integration schemes may lead
to the conclusion that the prospects for any
new cooperative endeavor, such as SADCC,
are bleak, and hence any further research
is useless. This is far from the truth, how-
ever. First, the SADCC approach is some-
what unusual; therefore, the experiences
of other integration efforts are only partly
relevant. Second, identification of possible
integration obstacles may help to avoid or
overcome them. Third, cooperating countries
may be better prepared to overcome obstacles
the more they are informed about potential
benefits. If these benefits are minor, it would
hardly pay to start a new cooperation scheme,
but if research indicates high potential bene-
fits, a new integration scheme could succeed.
40REGIONAL MARKET INTEGRATION
AND FOOD SECURITY
Although the SADCC countries do not
intend to set up a free trade area in the near
future, they are aware that "increasing trade
between SADCC members is essential if
SADCC is to develop regional coopera-
tion."
5
0 So far, regional integration schemes
have mostly promoted trade in industrial
products, perhaps because food policy is
considered a sensitive national policy issue
requiring a high degree of autonomy. The
SADCC countries agree, however, that re-
gional cooperation should contribute to food
security in the region.
The SADCC position on liberalizing
trade is somewhat ambiguous. On the one
hand, leaders of the member countries ar-
gue for postponing trade liberalization, on
the other hand, six of the nine SADCC coun-
tries—Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Tanza-
nia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe—are also mem-
bers of the Preferential Trade Area for East-
ern and Southern Africa (PTA). PTA's ulti-
mate objective is to establish a common
market by the year 2000, whereas SADCC's
aim is to foster joint actions, such as regional
stockpiling. PTA's 15 member countries
made the first cut in tariff rates on July 1,
1984. Thus, market integration has already
started for many SADCC countries. The fol-
lowing analysis may help assess market in-
tegration as a means of improving food secu-
rity within SADCC and PTA regions, and it
may help in assessing other integration ef-
forts.
Trade in agricultural products serves
three functions. First, trade can contribute
to stabilizing supply when national fluctua-
tions in production are greater than the fluc-
tuations in the region. Thus, free intrare-
gional trade among the SADCC countries
could be an efficient substitute for national
stockpiling and might be used to even out
fluctuations in national production. Johnson
shows that worldwide free trade in grains
would drastically reduce the need for hold-
ing carryover stocks, because fluctuations
in world cereal production are minimal
compared to fluctuations in national produc-
tion.
5
1 The same may hold true if variability
in production in individual member coun-
tries is greater than variability in production
for the SADCC region as a whole. However,
if production in all countries were perfectly
correlated, intraregional trade could not
help stabilize consumption.
Second, trade in agricultural products
may partly substitute for working stocks if
the harvesting calendar differs somewhat
among trading partners. Third, trade may
allow countries to specialize in production
in accordance with comparative advantage.
Thus, trade may help to increase national
income and improve food security. In this
chapter, the potential for trade expansion
based on the first and third functions of





Empirical evidence provided by Vaktes
and Siamwalla leads to the conclusion that
food consumption in a region will be more
5
0 Hanlon, SADCC: Progress, Projects, and Prospects, p. 67.
5
1 D. Gale Johnson, "Grain Insurance, Reserves, and Trade: Contributions to Food Security for LDCs," in Food
Security for Developing Countries, ed. Alberto Valdes (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), pp. 255-286; and
D. Gale Johnson, "Food Reserves and International Trade Policy," in International Trade and Agriculture: Theory
and Policy, ed. Jimmye S. Hillman and Andrew Schmitz (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 239-252.
41stable if its production is more stable than
that in individual countries and if trade be-
tween countries is allowed.
5
2 Instability is
measured with the Cuddy/Delia Valle
index.
5
3 This index is based on the coeffi-
cient of variation, corrected by the fitness
of a trend function. Thus,
I = CV\1 - R
2, (1)
where CV is the coefficient of variation and
R
2 is the adjusted coefficient of determin-
ation of an arithmetic linear or log-linear
trend function.
An instability index based on coefficient
of variation is superior to one based on vari-
ance, which is often chosen as an instability
indicator. Variance does not take into ac-
count that the quantity produced or con-
sumed varies among countries.
To derive the relationship between na-
tional and regional instability, the variance
in production of a region is given by
var(SQi)= 2 var (Q,)
+ 2 22 cov (Q.,0,), (2)
or
var (SO,) = 2 var (Q,)
n n
+ 2 2 2 r,, -JvarfCyvarfQ,), (3)
where
n
var (2 Qj) = variance of regional production
1 (around the trend),
l,...,n = number of countries,
var(Q|) = variance in production of coun-
try i and country j, and
cov{Q,,Qj)= covariance in production of
country i and country j, and
r,) = coefficient of correlation be-
tween deviation from trend
production of country i and j.
From equation (2) the coefficient of vari-
ation can be derived. This results in:
d.) = 2 s
2 cv (CM
+ 2 22 s, s, r,j cv (Q,) cv (Q,), (4)
where s, is the share of country i in regional
production.
Equation (4) allows the following con-
clusions to be drawn. Even if fluctuations
in national production among cooperating
countries are independent, the coefficient
of variation in the region's production may
be lower than the coefficient of variation in
any individual country. The region's coeffi-
cient of variation is not equal to the weigh-
ted sum of the individual countries' coeffi-
cients of variation but to the square root of
the weighted sum raised to the power of
two. A schematic example will clarify the
point.
Assume there are two countries with
production shares of 0.6 and 0.4. The re-
spective coefficients of variation are 0.08
and 0.06. Fluctuations in production are as-
sumed to be independent. According to
equation (4), the region receives a coeffi-
cient of variation of 0.0537, which is lower
than that of either country. Hence, cooper-
ation to reduce supply fluctuations in the
region may be reasonable even if fluctua-
tions in production are independent or
somewhat positively correlated. Of course,
the stabilizing effect will be greater if the
countries' fluctuations in production are
negatively correlated.
5
2 Valctes and Siamwalla, "Introduction."
5
3 The application of this measure implies that instability or variability are interpreted as deviations of actual data
from expected data (J. D. A. Cuddy and P. A. Delia Valle, "Measuring the Instability of Time Series Data," Oxford
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 40 [February 1978|: 79-85).
42Even if the coefficient of variation is re-
jected as a measure of instability in favor of
the variance, regional cooperation may be
shown to be reasonable even if fluctuations
in production are independent. Take, for
example, a two-country case, and assume
that country A's production is 100,110, or
90 with equal probability. For country B,
production is assumed to be SO, 60, or 40,
again with equal probability. The expected
value of production is 100 and 50. The vari-
ance of production is the same for both
countries—66.67. But the coefficients of
variation differ: they are 0.086 for country
A and 0.163 for country B. In deriving the
data set in Table 9, it is assumed that fluc-
tuations in the production of both countries
are independent. Hence, there are nine pos-
sible outcomes with equal probability. The
variance in the region's production is, of
course, equal to the sum of individual vari-
ances, that is 133.3. But the coefficient of
variation is only 0.07689, which is less than
the individual coefficients of variation.
Because integration is thought of as a
means of stabilizing consumption, con-
sumption data are also given in Table 9.
It is assumed that regional consumption is
always equal to regional production, and
that an individual country's share in con-
sumption is equal to the country's share of
expected regional production. This rule
guarantees that the coefficient of variation
in the individual country's consumption is
the same and equal to the coefficient of
variation of regional production. But for
both countries variance in consumption is
smaller as a result of integration. This exam-
ple illustrates that integration may not only
reduce the coefficient of variation in con-
sumption, but the variance as well. This can
happen even if fluctuations in production
are independent. Hence, negative covari-
ances between fluctuations in production
are not a necessary condition for stabilizing
consumption via integration.
Instability indexes w, which are cor-
rected coefficients of variation, have been
calculated for total cereal production on the
basis of data from 1960-80 for the SADCC
countries. The individual countries' share
in regional production and the matrix of the





























































coefficients of correlation between the
countries' fluctuations in production are
also shown. Thus one can see the relation-
ship between the region's instability index
and those of the individual countries and
the rest of the world, which indicates
whether an individual country would be bet-
ter off by integrating regionally or with the
rest of the world. Information about the ma-
trix of correlation coefficients and a coun-
try's share in regional production allows the
calculation of the integration effect of any
subgrouping.
Cereal production is volatile in the
SADCC countries (see Table 10). Botswana
has an unusually high instability index of
68.8. For seven of these nine countries pro-
duction fluctuates more than 10 percent.
Regional cooperation could reduce the insta-
bility index to 9.0. All countries would gain,
but Tanzania, which has an instability index
of 9.2, would gain the least. This indicates
that national incentives to cooperate region-
ally can vary widely.
Although the empirical results indicate
that regional cooperation would be a reason-
able strategy for achieving greater food secu-
rity, the instability index is higher for the
region than for the rest of the world. Per-
haps on these grounds it would be better
to integrate national markets directly into
43the world market. In reality, however, this
may be less advisable than the instability
indexes indicate.
If the world grain markets were ruled
by free trade, year-to- year price fluctuations
would be quite moderate even without any
carryover stocks. According to the calcula-
tions for this study, world grain production
fluctuated by only 2.4 percent during the
period 1960-80. Given a world price elastic-
ity of demand of about -0.5, prices would
vary by about 4.8 percent. An integrated
world grain economy would need no car-
ryover stocks in most years. Carryover
stocks only pay if the grain prices expected
for the next year are about 15 percent
higher than present prices. The probability
of such a situation would be slight in an
integrated world grain economy. The pro-
duction shortfall would have to be three
times larger than the standard deviation.
But according to Tchebycheff s theorem,
this would be likely to occur only once in
10 years.
5
4 If price fluctuations are pro-
nounced, it indicates that individual coun-
tries are not allowing trade to compensate
for fluctuations in production. Moreover,
national stocks are not being managed to
stabilize world market prices efficiently.
Hence, national stocks are needed, and re-
gional cooperation may be considered a ra-
tional strategy.
Comparative Advantage
and the Potential for
Trade Expansion
Global Trade Performance
So far, trade among the SADCC coun-
tries has been minimal (see Chapter 3, Table
3), but international trade of individual
countries has been quite significant. This
could support the widespread opinion that
because the countries have similar factor
endowments and climatic conditions, their
production patterns are too similar. With
only limited complementarity, the potential
for intraregional trade could be small.
To test this hypothesis, a production
similarity index is calculated.
5
5 This index
is defined by the formula:
S
Q(ab, c)
= {X Minimum [x, (ac),^ (be)]} 100, (5)
which measures the similarity of the pro-
duction patterns of countries a and b. x, (ac)
is the share of commodity i in a's agricultural
production, and X| (be) is the share of com-
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The example clearly shows that the index
will be 1 if the production patterns of the
two countries are completely similar. The
index will be 0 if the production patterns
are completely dissimilar.
Table 11 presents empirical results for
the three-year average, 1977-79. There are
5
4 TchebychefFs theorem states that it Is possible to determine what proportion of a distribution lies within
specifiable ranges of its mean. This information can be derived if the variance and the mean of the distribution
are known.
5
5 This index is completely analogous to the export similarity index developed by Finger and Kreinin. See J. M.
Finger and M. E. Kreinin, "A Measure of 'Export Similarity' and its Possible Uses," Economic Journal89 (December
1979): 905-912.
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45significant differences in the production pat-
terns of the countries, especially of Tan-
zania. The smallest countries in the region,
Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, are the
most similar. This could be because their
resources and climate are similar or it could
be the consequence of similar agricultural
policies aimed at autarky. The actual cause
may be revealed when the export patterns
of the countries are investigated.
Similarity of production patterns can
also be examined with the help of a compar-
ative production performance coefficient
(COP), which is defined as
49
COP = Q,,/Qiw: X (V2 Q|W. (7)
Q stands for quantity produced, and the sub-
scripts i, j, and w refer to the type of product,
the country in question, and the world, re-
spectively. An index value of more than
unity means that the particular commodity
has a larger share in total agricultural pro-
duction of the individual country than it has
in world production.
If the hypothesis is correct that the nine
SADCC countries have similar resources
and climates, the CQP coefficients for indi-
vidual products of the countries will vary
only a little, if at all. Since it is not possible
to present the coefficients for all 49 products
included in the calculations, Table 12 gives
only the three products with the highest
coefficients for each country. Some products
are obviously much more important for in-
dividual SADCC countries than for world
agriculture. But a different set of products
is of major interest for the individual coun-
tries. Eighteen products rank among the top
three from the point of view of the individ-
ual countries. Only five products are ranked
more than once. This clearly indicates that
the agricultural production pattern differs
considerably among the SADCC countries.
Differences in the production pattern
will most likely be reflected in differences
in the export patterns of the individual
countries. To investigate this hypothesis
some additional indexes have been calcu-
lated. In Table 13 export similarity indexes
are presented.
5




= {X Minimum [x, (ac), Xi (be)]} 100, (8)
il
which measures the similarity of the export
patterns of countries a and b to market c.
x, (ac) is the share of commodity i in a's
exports to c and xt (be) is the share of com-
modity i in b's exports to c. If the export
patterns of countries a and b are the same,
it holds that x, (ac) = x, (be) for each product
i. In this case, the index will take on a value
of 100. If the export patterns are completely
dissimilar, the value of the index will be
zero.
In carrying out the calculations, world
exports of SADCC countries are also com-
pared by pairing countries that are most
similar. The generally low indexes indicate
that for the most part the export patterns
are dissimilar. The exports of Zambia and
Malawi were most alike, followed by those
of Zambia and Zimbabwe, but even indexes
around 50 do not support the hypothesis
that there is limited scope for trade within
the region because the countries are too
similar. Finger and Kreinin found similarity
indexes around 50 for U.S.-EC exports in
the early 1970s, but there has since been
a significant expansion in U.S.-EC bilateral
trade.
5
7 Dissimilar patterns of agricultural
exports among the SADCC countries raise
expectations for expanding intraregional
trade in agricultural products through mar-
ket integration. Other indicators support
these expectations, too.
If the countries under consideration
were really similar in production and trade
patterns, coefficients for comparative advan-


































































































































Source: Author's calculations based on the data for 47 products from the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, FAO Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, various years).
Notes: n.a. stands for not available. Indexes greater than 1 mean that the commodity has a larger share in
agricultural production in the country than in the world. The indexes shown for each country are for
the three crops with the highest coefficients.
mance (CEP) would be similar.
S
8 The RCA
indicators have been calculated according
to the following formula:
49 49
RCA = ln(X,/M,: 2 X,/2 M,)f (9)
where X, and M, denote exports and im-
ports, respectively, of 49 agricultural prod-
ucts. The higher the RCA index, the more
successful is the country in exporting prod-
uct i. The RCA index will be negative if the
country is only importing product i or if the
ratio of export and import values for product
i is smaller than the ratio of the total agricul-
tural exports and imports.
The measure used for calculating CEP
coefficients is
5
8 These and other indexes have been applied byjourgen Donges et al., The Second Enlargement of the European
Community: Adjustment Requirements and Challenges for Policy Reform, Kieler Studies 1971 (Tuebingen: J. C.
Mohr, 1982), p. 78. Also see J. M. Finger and D. A. Derose, "Trade Overlap, Comparative Advantage, and
Protection," in On the Economics of Intra-Industry Trade: Symposium 1978, ed. H. Giersch (Tuebingen: J.C.
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48CEP = X./X i'-'Mw(
49 49
(10)
where Xt are export values for product i of
the country under consideration and Xlw
are world exports of product i. An index of
more than unity says that the individual
country's export values of product i divided
by the country's total agricultural export
values are greater than the world exports
of product i divided by the value of total
agricultural exports. Thus, CEP> 1 implies
that export product i is more important from
the individual country's point of view than
for the world.
RCA and CEP indicators have been cal-
culated for 49 agricultural products. But for
lack of space, Table 14 only gives the results
and export shares for the most important
products. All countries appear to be highly
specialized as far as agricultural exports are
concerned. RCA and CEP coefficients are
generally high for the dominant export prod-
ucts. However, the pattern of specialization
differs considerably among the countries.
As a consequence, the SADCC region is
much less specialized than the individual
countries. Again, this supports the hypoth-
esis that SADCC countries either differ con-
siderably in their production possibilities or
they have decided to specialize in different
directions. In any event, the potential for
expanding intraregional trade is there, even
if present production patterns are not
changed. That this potential has not been
exploited so far is revealed by the trade over-




= 2( X min(X,, M,) 1
(11)
The coefficient varies between O and 1 for
each of 49 products. It will be zero if the
country only exports or imports a product.
It will be 1 if a country both exports and
imports a product.
It may be argued that trade will overlap
only slightly for agricultural products be-
cause a country produces either a surplus
of a product or it has to bridge a deficit. But
this argument neglects the geographical di-
mension of the countries and their internal
heterogeneity. The RCA and CEP coeffi-
cients indicate a significant heterogeneity
among the SADCC countries. It cannot be
expected, however, that the production pat-
tern among subregions within a country will
be homogeneous or that national border
lines will enclose an area of homogeneous
production. Indeed, natural conditions are
often similar between subregions that are
divided by a national boundary, whereas
areas that are not closely related to each
other but belong to the same national entity
may not be at all alike. Thus one would
expect significant trade in agricultural prod-
ucts among subregions within a country,
and among neighboring countries as well.
But Table 15 does not support these expec-
tations. There is almost no trade overlap for
most of the SADCC countries. The only ex-
ception is Lesotho where trade flows prob-
ably overlap because of Lesotho's member-
ship in the South African Customs Union.
Of special interest are the overlap in-
dexes for the SADCC region as a whole (last
line of Table 15). On average, the region
spent about 15 percent of the revenue
gained from exporting a product for imports
of the same product. This clearly supports
the hypothesis that there is a potential for
expanding intraregional trade. The trade
overlap indicator for the region underesti-
mates the potential on two counts. First, it
does not take into consideration the trade
potential from heterogeneity among subreg-
ions within a country, as discussed above.
Second, at present the countries are not
specialized according to comparative advan-
tage because prices and price ratios differ.
Free trade would lead to an equalization of
prices and price ratios, it would affect the
countries' production patterns, and thus it
would enlarge the potential for intraregional
trade.
So far, only an aggregate overview has
been represented. A more disaggregated
presentation follows in order to specify
those products for which intraregional trade
expansion can be expected to expand the




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author's calculations based on International Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC Trade Data Base,"
Washington, D.C., 1985 (computer printout).
" The higher the Revealed Comparative Advantage Index, the more successful the country has been at exporting
the product.
b A Comparative Export Performance Index greater than 1 means that exports of a product are a larger part Of
the total agricultural exports of the country than of the world.
most. For SADCC, this coefficient has been
calculated as
TE = [Min (X,, M,)/
Max (X,, M,)] -100. (12)
This coefficient indicates the percentage of
the region's exports that are matched by
imports from the region. The results for prod-
ucts with a coefficient greater than 10 in
1977-79 are presented in Table 16. Prod-
ucts with the greatest scope for expanding
intraregional trade are live animals, meat,
maize, vegetables, sugar and honey, vege-
table oils, and animal feeds. In 1977-79,
intraregional trade as a percentage of foreign
trade for these products ranged from 19.1
percent (animal feed) to 76.2 percent (vege-
















































Source: Author's calculations based on International
Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC
Trade Data Base," Washington, D.C., 1985
(computer printout).
52Table 16—Potential intraregional



















































































Source: Author's calculations based on International
Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC
Trade Data Base," Washington, D.C., 1985
(computer printout).
Notes: These values are calculated by taking the lesser
between the value of exports and the value of
imports of a commodity in a period, and divid-
ing it by the greater, and multiplying by 100:
TE = [min (x,, xm,)/max (x,, m,)] 100.
tables). If the trade pattern for 1977-79 can
be accepted as a reference, intraregional
trade in agricultural products could account
for 11 percent of foreign trade in agricultural
products. Again, it must be emphasized that
these results underestimate the actual trade
potential. Market integration among the
SADCC countries would certainly affect the
countries' production and trade patterns
and thus increase trade more than is likely
in the present production and trade situa-
tion. Moreover, dynamic effects will help
to boost intraregional trade. Trade in meat
and animal feed, which is already promis-
ing, is likely to have the most benefit. Sarma
has observed a strong tendency for growth
in livestock consumption and feed use in
developing countries.
5
9 If these trends con-
tinue, market integration among the
SADCC countries would probably generate
more highly positive changes in trade flows
than indicated by the past trade pattern.
Because RCA and CEP indexes for meat and
animal feed vary among the countries, intra-
regional specialization could give rise to ad-
ditional intraregional trade.
The impact of market integration on pro-
duction and consumption of staple foods is
of special interest for assessing food secu-
rity. Therefore, potential trade in cereals as
the result of market integration will be
explored in more detail.
Transport Costs Determine Benefits
Transport costs are an important deter-
minant of a country's comparative advan-
tage. This is especially true for bulky staples
with relatively low production costs but
high transport costs per unit. Hence, in
identifying a country's comparative advan-
tage, information is needed, not only about
domestic costs of production for individual
products but also about the distance to the
market where the products can be sold
abroad and the transport costs from the lo-
cation of production to the destination of
exports. If neighboring countries are not
willing to open their borders for foreign
trade or if they set up high barriers to exter-
nal trade, a country may have a stronger
advantage in trading with faraway destina-
tions than with neighboring countries. It
may also be that a country is not competitive
in all staples in overseas markets and may
have comparative advantages in selling to
and buying from neighboring countries.
5
9 J.S. Sarma, "Cereal Feed Use in the Third World: Past Trends and Projections to 1990 and 2000," International
Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C., July 1985 (mimeographed); and J. S. Sarma and Patrick Yeung,
Livestock Products in the Third World: Past Trends and Projections to 1990 and 2000, Research Report 49
(Washington D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1985).
53Thus, if the establishment of a regional in-
tegration scheme among previously highly
protected countries creates trade, it is defi-
nitely welfare-improving. Of course, the
size of potential welfare effects from reg-
ional integration needs to be quantified with
empirical evidence. However, in theory
conditions can be specified to increase the
probability of positive welfare effects.
First, regional market integration will
increase the welfare of the integrating coun-
tries the greater the differential between
import and export parity prices for trade
with third countries and the smaller the
differential for intraregional trade. In such
cases it is likely that individual countries
may have no potential for welfare increases
through interregional trade, but they may
have a potential for welfare-generating
intraregional trade. The differential be-
tween import and export parity prices will
be greater: the longer the distance from the
nearest port to the destination of exports or
the origin of imports; the higher the port
costs from inadequate port capacity or inef-
ficient port management; and the higher
the land transport costs to and from the port.
Second, given these conditions, regional
market integration will increase welfare
more the higher the variability of produc-
tion on the subregional level and the lower
the variability of production on the SADCC
level. This could be an additional trade in-
centive.
These conditions for welfare-generating
trade effects certainly exist for the SADCC
countries. First, these countries are far away
from other exporting or importing regions.
Hence, there is a large differential between
c.i.f. import prices for cereals and corres-
ponding f.o.b. export prices. To indicate the
size of the differential, Table 17 presents
results for the period 1977/78-1983/84. It
must be noted that these are not observed
prices, but hypothetical, because the region
seldom exports and imports the same type
of grain in the same year. Nevertheless, the
data show the significance of the distance
of the SADCC region from potential import-
ing and exporting countries. In carrying out
the calculation, a port charge for loading
and unloading vessels of $ 10 per metric ton
has been assumed. The port charge can be
a significant determinant of international
trade.
Land transport costs are even more im-
portant in the case of the SADCC countries.
An Italian research firm hired by SADCC
to conduct a prefeasibility study of market
integration, Technosynesis, estimated the
following costs for transport of cereals:
0.052 to 0.132 cents per kilometer per ton
by road, depending on the quality of the
road; and 0.06 cents per kilometer per ton
by railroad.
6
0 To assess the relevance of land
transport costs in the SADCC region, import
and export parity prices were calculated for
selected locations, the most important of
which are railway or road connections.
The results of the calculations are pre-
sented in Table 18. First, the differential
between import and export parity prices is
large in all locations. Export parity prices
are so low that it rarely pays to produce
cereals for export to overseas markets.
Second, if no intraregional trade is al-
lowed, it seems likely that each subregion
would produce as much as it consumes. Sub-
regions that are the farthest from the port,
especially where road transport is a signifi-
cant part of total transport costs (for exam-
ple, transport to Maun, Botswana, or Rum-
phi, Malawi), are most likely to have a policy
of autarky for staple foods.
Third, if no intraregional trade is al-
lowed, price ratios between types of grain
would probably vary widely from location
to location. Price ratios at one location could
well be the reverse of those in a neighboring
location, and they could be completely dif-
ferent than either the ratio of prices at East
African ports or at export locations in coun-
tries like the United States. For these rea-
sons, it is not advisable to accept the world
market price ratio as a guideline for setting
domestic prices in East African countries.
Fourth, if no intraregional trade is al-
lowed and if production of individual grains
6
0 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Regional Food Security Programme, "Regional Food
Reserve," main report of a prefeasibility study prepared by Technosynesis, Zimbabwe, January 1984, p. 249.




































































Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Food Outlook (No. 10, 1984), pp. 26-27; and
International Wheat Council, World Wheat Statistics (London: IWC, 1984), pp. 79-81.
Notes: Import prices are c.i.f. and include a port charge of $ 10 per metric ton; export prices are f.o.b. Calculations
are based on wheat shipping rates between U.S. Gulf, EC (Rotterdam), and East African ports, and price
data are for U.S. No. 1 hard winter wheat, No. 2 yellow maize, and No. 2 sorghum.
Table 18—Import and export parity prices for maize, sorghum, and wheat






















































































































































































































































































































































Source: Author's calculations based on Table 17; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Food
Outlook {No. 10, 1984), pp. 26-27; and International Wheat Council, World Wheat Statistics (London:
IWC, 1984), pp. 79-81; and data for transport costs from Southern African Development Coordination
Conference, Regional Food Security Programme.
Note: It has been assumed that shipments will be made by train whenever there is a railway connection.
fluctuates significantly, subregional prices
would also fluctuate or carryover stocks
would be held subregionally to stabilize
prices. Because of the large differential be-
tween import and export parity prices for
interregional trade, it would not pay to ex-
port excess quantities in years of good har-
vests or to import excessively in years of
bad harvests. Hence, carryover stocks have
to be substituted for trade.
Fifth, past trade flows may be a mislead-
ing indicator of the trade-generating effects
of regional integration schemes. For coun-
tries that are considering integrating their
markets but have not traded with each other
so far because of trade barriers, actual trade
in staple foods in the past may have been
negligible. Nevertheless, the potential for
intraregional trade may be high. The larger
the difference between prices at neighbor-
ing locations, the higher the potential where
there is no intraregional trade.
The empirical investigation of export
and import parity prices is based on the
assumption that each of the SADCC coun-
tries would only trade with overseas coun-
tries. Certainly, the differential between ex-
port and import parity prices for trade would
be much smaller between member coun-
tries, indicating that a policy of self-suffi-
56ciency in staples would be less favorable
from an economic point of view. Whether
the large differences between import and
export parity prices for interregional trade
would actually give rise to intraregional
trade if markets were integrated depends
on other empirical data.
First, it is presumed that the potential
for intraregional trade is higher, the more
the region as a whole is self-sufficient in
staple foods but individual countries are not.
Market integration would help to substitute
intraregional for interregional trade pro-
vided that exporting countries can receive
higher export prices and importing coun-
tries can obtain lower import prices.
Table 19 presents the food balance sheet
in grain equivalents for the region. It shows
that the region would have been more than
self-sufficient in grain equivalents in 1980
if production had been the average for the
years 1979-81. Of course, this outcome is
not only a mirror of the region's production
potential and consumer needs, it is also a
consequence of the price levels and ratios
set by the governments of the individual
countries. A different set of producer and
consumer prices could also affect the level
and pattern of production and consumption.
However, the figures indicate that the re-
gion could produce enough staple food to
feed the region's population. This is quite
important for the trade potential of integrat-
ing the markets of these countries. Market
integration could largely substitute intrare-
gional for interregional trade, which would
have welfare-generating effects for the part-
ner countries.
In investigating the potential benefits of
market integration from this point on, it is
reasonable to consider the region as a nearly
closed economy. There would be more trade
creation and less trade diversion where
terms are used as defined by Viner.
6
1 Trade
creating effects will be greater: the more
the food balance of individual countries is
unbalanced, either for total staple foods or
for individual staples; the more a country's
consumption pattern changes from the cre-
ation of intraregional trade; and the more
the region's products differ in quality from
the goods traded interregionally.
Table 20 shows that only one of the
nine SADCC countries does not produce a
surplus of at least one staple food. The pro-
duction of the individual country would de-
finitely become more imbalanced if free
trade among the member countries were
allowed. This presumption is supported by
the evidence that where specific staples,
such as rice and cassava, are not produced,
they are seldom included in the diet. Cas-
sava is a case in point. It is not produced
as a main staple food in three SADCC coun-
tries. Five countries produce a significant
surplus. It is possible that the population in
those countries that do not produce cassava
might consume cassava if it were available,
especially in years when crops of the favored
staples of these countries fail. It can be ar-
gued, however, that cassava is a bulky prod-
uct with low value but high transport costs,
and therefore it is not an internationally
tradable product.
This argument is only valid for interre-
gional trade. Intraregional trade would prob-
ably be practiced by private traders. Oppor-
tunity costs of these traders could be quite
low, which would allow them to transport
cassava up to 700 kilometers, as has been
reported for Nigeria.
6
2 Trade in cassava
could contribute significantly to food secu-
rity in the region because this product is
more drought resistant than other staples.
Moreover, countries could partly adjust the
quantity harvested annually to consumption
needs. Thus, cassava production can be used
to stabilize consumption with fluctuations
in production of other staples.
The potential for growth in intraregional
trade is higher if countries with surplus pro-
duction in some staples are bordered by
countries with deficit production in the
same staples. Table 21 shows that five coun-
tries with surplus production in some
staples were bordered by countries that im-
6
1 Jacob Viner, The Customs Union Issue (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1950).
6
2 James H. Cock, Cassava: New Potential for a Neglected Crop (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), p. 9.
57Table 19—Aggregate food production and consumption balance for the
SADCC countries, 1980








































Source: Author's calculations based on Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Food Balance
Sheets (Rome: FAO, various years).
Note: The production average is for 1979-81 j consumption figures are for 1980.
ported these products in 1979-81. Thus
there is potential for intraregional trade,
even with the present production and con-
sumption patterns of individual countries.
Because free trade within the region would
lead to a change in the price pattern and
the availability of specific products, like cas-
sava, the production and consumption pat-
terns in individual countries would adjust
and thus increase the potential.
Liberalization of intraregional trade in
maize is especially important. Because con-
sumers in the SADCC countries prefer
white maize to yellow maize, white maize
is mainly produced in the region. Interna-
tional trade is mostly in yellow maize, how-
ever. Hence the markets for white maize in
Africa are thin markets where prices fluctu-
ate significantly with fluctuations in produc-
tion or in price policies. Such situations are
more likely to occur if individual countries
choose not to trade in staples or choose to
trade only with overseas countries and not
with each other. Intraregional trade would
Table 20—Production and consumption balances for staple foods and shares






















































































































































Source: Author's calculations based on Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Food Balance
Sheets (Rome: FAO, various years).
Notes: 1 is the average production in grain equivalent from 1979 to 1981/apparent consumption 1980 x 100.
2 is the share of consumption.










































Wheat, rice, millet and sorghum
Wheat, rice, maize
Wheat
Wheat, rice, millet and sorghum
Wheat, rice, maize
Wheat
Wheat, rice, millet and sorghum
Wheat, rice, maize
Wheat, rice, maize




Rice, millet and sorghum, cassava
3
Wheat, rice, maize, millet and sorghum, cassava"
Source: Classification is based on Table 20.
' Consumption of cassava is negligible at this time.
contribute to stabilizing national maize mar-
kets and would reduce transport costs.
Moreover, exporting countries could cap-
ture some of the premium for white maize,
which is only traded on African markets.
This premium accounts for about 10 percent
of the price for yellow maize.
6
3
Next, how much could be saved in trans-
port costs if SADCC countries traded intra-
regionally is calculated. Assuming that Zam-
bia's production of staple foods in 1980 was
equal to the average for 1979-81 and assum-
ing that consumption was normal in 1981,
Zambia's import needs would have been
96,000 metric tons of maize and 90,500
tons of wheat, both expressed in grain equi-
valents.
6
4 Based on the same assumptions
as those made for Zambia, the neighboring
country, Zimbabwe, would have had an ex-
portable surplus of 46,400 tons of wheat and
341,800 tons of maize. Zambia could have
bought all her maize imports and 46,400
tons of wheat from Zimbabwe instead of
from overseas. Assuming 1977/78 import
and export parity prices for Lusaka and Bula-
wayo, Zambia would have had to pay U.S.
$187 for maize and U.S. $204 for wheat
imported from overseas. For imports from
Zimbabwe, the prices would have been U.S.
$88.56 for maize and U.S. $95.56 for
wheat. Hence, Zambia could have saved
U.S. $103.44 per ton of grain equivalents.
Total savings, which could have been di-
vided between Zambia and Zimbabwe,
would have amounted to U.S. $ 14.5 million
($5.0 million for wheat and $9.5 million
for maize) without taking into account the
premium for white maize. Certainly, U.S.
$14.5 million is not negligible. Zambia's
agricultural domestic product in 1965
6
3 World Bank, Malawi: The Development of the Agricultural Sector, Report 3459 (Washington, D.C.: World
Bank, 1981), p. 52.
6
4 All tons in this report are metric tons.
59prices was 158.5 million kwacha in 1980-
82,
6
5 equal to U.S. $179.5 million at the
1981 exchange rate.
6
6 Trading of maize and
wheat between Zambia and Zimbabwe
could have led to savings in transport costs
equal to 8.6 percent of Zambia's agricultural
domestic product.
Of course, these calculations do not
quantify the exact gains from savings in
transport costs. Some of the gains may have
already been captured by trade within the
region. Nevertheless, they highlight the
comparative advantage of intraregional ver-
sus interregional trade.
Savings in transport costs will material-
ize if one country produces a surplus of a
specific commodity and the neighboring
country generates a deficit, but transport
costs can also be reduced if there are subre-
gional imbalances between production and
consumption within countries, and trade is
permitted to flow across the border. Thus,
a country with a deficit in maize in one year
may become an exporter in the next be-
cause some subregions within the country
may produce a surplus that could be ex-
ported to deficit subregions in a neighboring
country. This indicates that trade flows
among the member countries would be dif-
ferent from the present export and import
trade flows.
Liberalized intraregional trade could
also lead to a reduction in transport costs
in one country if subregional production
fluctuates with nonpositive covariances of
the fluctuations in neighboring subregions
of another country. Subregions near the bor-
der are normally remote from central do-
mestic markets. Hence, fluctuations in pro-
duction will either lead to significant price
fluctuations in these subregions or addi-
tional transport resources will be required.
If, however, these bordering countries are
allowed to trade with each other, transport
costs may be lower. This is more likely, the
more there are negative or zero covariances
between fluctuations in production on both
sides of the border. Therefore, these corre-
lation coefficients have been calculated for
total cereals.
In Table 22 the coefficient of correlation
is sometimes negative, indicating negative
covariances, and in all cases it is statistically
insignificant, indicating that fluctuations are
independent. Hence, free border trade
could help to compensate for subregional
fluctuations in production.
So far, only the potential savings in
transport costs for liberalized intraregional
trade in staples have been considered, but
the effects would be similar if intraregional
trade in nonstaple agricultural products
were allowed.
Regional Market Integration and
Savings in Resource Costs
The economic theory of market integra-
tion mainly deals with the question of
whether integration could lead to improved
factor allocation and hence to an increase
in overall production with a given endow-
ment of resources. It has already been con-
cluded that there could be savings in re-
source costs if integrating countries differ
in comparative advantage and the trade-
creating effect outweighs the trade-divert-
ing effect. Trade-diverting effects have
largely been ruled out for the SADCC coun-
tries and differences in comparative advan-
tage have been established.
Another indicator of differences in com-
parative advantage is the size of domestic
resource costs (DRCs) for individual crops.
DRC is the value of the domestic resources
used to produce a unit of net foreign ex-
change. The lower the DRC for a specific
product, the more it pays to expand produc-
tion of this product. Unfortunately, DRCs
are not available for production of individual
staples in all SADCC countries. However,
a rough calculation using DRCs for Zambia
6
5 This is a five-year moving average (World Bank, Zambia: Policy Options and Strategies for Agricultural Growth,
Report No. 4764-ZA (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1984], p. 82).
6
6 The exchange rate for 1981 was 0.883 kwacha per U.S. dollar (United Nations, Statistical Office, Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics 39 [No. 1, January 1985], p. 234).




Menongue, Angola - Mongu, Zambia
Maun, Botswana - Lusaka, Zambia
Maun, Botswana - Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Francistown, Botswana-Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Rumphi, Malawi - Lichinga, Mozambique
Rumphi, Malawi - Mbeya, Tanzania
Rumphi, Malawi - Mtwava, Tanzania
Rumphi, Malawi - Kasama, Zambia
Rumphi, Malawi - Chipata, Zambia
Lilongwe, Malawi - Lichinga, Mozambique
Lilongwe, Malawi- Tete, Mozambique
Lilongwe, Malawi - Chipata, Zambia
Blantyre, Malawi - Manpula, Mozambique
Blantyre, Malawi - Tete, Mozambique
Manpula, Mozambique - Mtwava, Tanzania
Lichinga, Mozambique - Mtwava, Tanzania
Tete, Mozambique - Chipata, Zambia
Tete, Mozambique - Lusaka, Zambia
Tete, Mozambique - Harare, Zimbabwe
Tete, Mozambique - Hasvlngo, Zimbabwe
Inhambane, Mozambique - Bulawayo, Zimbabwe
Inhambane, Mozambique - Hasvingo, Zimbabwe
Naputo, Mozambique - Manzini, Swaziland
Mbeya, Tanzania - Kasama, Zambia
Chipata, Zambia- Harare, Zimbabwe




























Source: Author's calculations; and Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Regional Food Secu-
rity Programme, "Regional Food Reserve," prepared by Technosynesis for the Southern African Develop-
ment Coordination Conference on Regional Food Security, Zimbabwe, 1984, p. 263.
Notes: Values of R > 0.638 are significant at the 95 percent level. Fluctuations around the trend were projected
for the period 1985-94 by Technosynesis.
will be used to quantify possible gains from
an adjustment of the country's production




According to World Bank estimates, the
DRC for producing maize in Zambia is 2.94
and for producing wheat 0.40. Assuming
that incentives were given to expand wheat
production at the cost of a reduction in
maize production,
6
8 and that the change in
the production pattern would be compen-
sated for by corresponding changes in im-
ports from the neighboring country of Zim-
babwe, yields for maize were 2.14 tons per
hectare and yields for wheat were 3.99 tons
per hectare in 1978-80. Hence, increasing
the area under wheat by 1 hectare and de-
creasing the area under maize by 1 hectare
would lead to savings in DRC equal to 2.94
x 2.14 xPm + 0.6 x 3.99 x Pw, where
Pm and Pw stand for the import parity prices
of maize and wheat for imports from Zim-
babwe. Taking into account Zimbabwe's ex-
port parity prices for exports to overseas'
markets and adding the transport costs from
Bulawayo, Zimbabwe to Lusaka, Zambia,
6
7 World Bank, Zambia: Policy Options, p. 38.
6
8 Certainly, this would not be feasible for all ecological zones in the country; however, in 1975-82 wheat
production increased from 160 tons in 1965-70 to 1,200 tons (See World Bank, Zambia. Policy Options, p. 26).
61Zambia's import parity price for intrare-
gional trade would have been U.S. $ 111.56
per ton for maize and U.S. $118.56 per ton
for wheat in 1983/84. Hence, total savings
in DRC would have been U.S. $985.72 per
hectare. This clearly indicates that an adjust-
ment in the domestic production pattern
for comparative advantage can result in high
returns. Of course, the size of the total gain
depends on the extent of differences in com-
parative advantage among the SADCC coun-
tries, which appear to be significant from
the calculations above. These observations
go against expectations because these coun-
tries are located in the same geographical
region, and conditions for agricultural pro-
duction might be expected to be the same.
However, differences in comparative advan-
tage arise mainly from variances in climate,
in soil conditions, and in opportunity costs.
There is sufficient evidence that the ef-
fects of these determinants of comparative
advantage vary widely among the countries
of the region. Rainfall, for example, varies
from more than 1,400 millimeters a year
in the northern areas to less than 200 mil-
limeters in the South. Soil conditions vary
too, as indicated by differences in ecological
zones and in percentages of arable land,
permanent cropland, permanent pasture,
and forest in total land (see the Appendix,
Table 32).
Variances in opportunity costs are espe-
cially relevant for determining comparative
advantage. Opportunity costs vary among
the countries because national shadow
prices for inputs vary. This certainly holds
true for the shadow price of land because
land availability and yields for competitive
crops differ. It also holds true for shadow
prices of agricultural products because im-
port and export parity prices vary. Even vari-
ances in the national shadow prices for
purchased inputs, such as fertilizer or seeds,
may be a significant determinant of vari-
ations in comparative advantage. A high
variance in national shadow prices for
purchased inputs is to be expected if these
inputs have to be imported. High transport
costs, especially for road transportation, will
lead to a high degree of variance in shadow
prices from place to place. Therefore, the
comparative advantage of a country in a spe-
cific product not only depends on the phys-
ical production possibilities of a country but
also on the general economic environment,
as indicated by infrastructure, transport
costs, distances to markets, and other fac-
tors.
Specialization will generate even more
benefits if the consumption pattern changes
significantly over time. An increasing de-
mand for livestock products and poultry is
a case in point. As pork and poultry produc-
tion is only marginally tied to land endow-
ment, prices for inputs and the final product
are most important for selecting the location
for production units. In developed countries
transport costs are more important in deter-
mining the regional price patterns of
feedstuffs than of pork and poultry. Live-
stock industries tend to be located where
feed prices are the lowest. Therefore, mar-
ket integration of the SADCC countries
could contribute to reduced costs for the
expanding livestock production in the re-
gion.
Other positive allocative effects can be
expected in the food processing sector from
exploitation of economies of scale. It is well
known that food processing industries in
developing countries rarely use their full
productive capacity because the domestic
market is so small. Market integration
among the SADCC countries could use re-
sources more efficiently in these industries,
leading to significant benefits as demand for
processed food grows over time. Similar
economies of scale could also be gained in
production of agricultural inputs, such as
fertilizer and farm machinery.
One prospective source of positive inte-
gration effects that has been completely neg-
lected by the economic theory of integration
concerns savings in administrative costs. If
small landlocked countries pursue their agri-
cultural market and price policies autonom-
ously and set domestic prices differently
than neighboring countries, incentives for
smuggling products across the border are
built-in. This illegal border trade can only
be avoided if there is efficient control of all
border transactions, which could absorb a
large amount of manpower—labor that
62could be used more efficiently for producing
goods and services. Moreover, border trade,
whether legal or illegal, increases welfare,
whereas avoidance of border trade through
effective means of control diminishes it.
Border trade increases welfare in the export-
ing region because the consequential in-
crease in market prices increases producer
surplus more than it decreases consumer
surplus. The effects are reversed in the im-
porting regions; the positive change in con-
sumer surplus will outweigh the negative
change in producer welfare. Thus, liberaliz-
ing intraregional trade could have a twofold




Removal of barriers to intraregional
trade is certainly necessary if all the poten-
tial benefits of market integration are to be
captured. However, reducing or abolishing
these barriers is not enough to guarantee
that potential gains will be exploited. Ad-
justments in the internal and external agri-
cultural trade regimes and in exchange rate
policies are also necessary. Merely remov-
ing trade barriers may reduce the welfare
of some countries if the necessary comple-
mentary adjustments in policies are not
made. Hence, if countries are unwilling or
unable to adjust their domestic trade re-
gimes and exchange rate policies because
of political constraints, it might be better
for them to postpone complete market inte-
gration. Instead, they could undertake par-
tial regional trade arrangements to exploit
at least some of the benefits of market inte-
gration.
It should be obvious that integrated mar-
kets can only function adequately if trade
in agricultural products within the countries
is ruled by market forces. Uniform prices
for all locations within a country (panterrito-
rial) and in all seasons set by individual gov-
ernments of the SADCC countries are polit-
ical prices and are obstacles to optimal re-
source allocation. They do not reflect each
country's comparative advantage. It is hard
to find empirical evidence to support the
allegation that these prices are set in rela-
tion to costs of production.
6
9 If two coun-
tries trade freely but set different panterrito-
rial prices, their domestic trade regimes
would collapse. Trade would flow from the
country with lower prices to the country
with higher prices, and this flow would
probably have no basis in the comparative
advantages of the two countries. Con-
sequently, the country with low prices could
not enforce these prices and the country
with higher panterritorial prices would have
to build up government stocks. Neither con-
sequence is acceptable from a political or
an economic point of view.
Coordinating panterritorial prices among
the integrating countries is no solution.
Common panterritorial prices would partly
avoid policy-induced trade flows. They
would not, however, allow the countries to
specialize according to comparative advan-
tage. Resources can be allocated optimally
only if prices between countries that trade
with each other are allowed to reflect trans-
portation costs. Transportation costs are im-
portant in determining supply prices within
the SADCC countries. Hence, prices among
the SADCC countries should vary signifi-
cantly if resources are to be allocated opti-
mally.
Market integration among the SADCC
countries means not only that domestic
price and market policies must be liberal-
ized, but also that external trade in agricul-
tural products must be harmonized. If inte-
grating countries have different external
trade restrictions, regional trade flows could
be distorted. Countries with lower tariffs
might import from countries outside the re-
gion and sell the imported quantities profit-
ably to other countries in the integration
scheme, negating the purpose of the higher
tariff.
6
5 Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Price Policy in Africa," Thirteenth FAO Regional
Conference for Africa, Harare, Zimbabwe, July 16-25, 1984.
63But even if the integrating countries
agree on common external trade restric-
tions, the viability of the integration scheme
might be weakened by trade. Assume that
the difference between import and export
parity prices is negligible and that countries
agree to set a uniform external tariff. Also
assume that production in some countries
surpasses domestic consumption and that
other countries need to import. The import-
ing country, which could buy its imports at
world market prices if it did not belong to
the integration scheme, would have to buy
at higher prices from a country that is a part
of the integration scheme. Thus, real in-
come would be transferred from the import-
ing countries to the exporting countries.
Such invisible transfer flows will always
arise if the integrating countries put restric-
tions on international trade. In the SADCC
countries, however, the borders with neigh-
boring African countries not in the SADCC
would have to be controlled anyway, and
because the SADCC region is nearly self-suf-
ficient in staple foods, border trade with
nonmember African countries could be
excluded. Staple foods would only be im-
ported from overseas countries if the entire
region experienced a poor harvest not com-
pensated for by stocks. Liberalization of
overseas trade should therefore be consid-
ered.
Another obstacle to liberalizing trade
within the region, exchange rate policies,
is much more difficult to overcome. The
currencies of most developing countries is
overvalued but the extent is hard to quan-
tify. Assuming that in 1970 the exchange
market was in equilibrium for all SADCC
countries, the overvaluation of purchasing
power for the average 1978-80 period was
1.42 in Tanzania, 1.24 in Zambia, 1.15 in
Malawi, and 1.11 in Zimbabwe.
7
0 If these
countries were to liberalize trade and to
accept the currencies of other SADCC coun-
tries in exchange for products, significant
amounts of real income would be trans-
ferred. For example, from 1970 to 1978-80,
Tanzania paid 23.5 percent less for its im-
ports from neighboring Malawi and re-
ceived 23.5 percent more for its exports to
Malawi because of the overvaluation. Clearly,
if each country accepted the other's cur-
rency in exchange for products, Malawi
would lose and Tanzania would benefit.
This problem of weak currencies cannot be
solved just by asking for a clearing of the
imbalance of trade in hard currencies.
7
1
Transfer effects are generated, even if trade
in national currencies is balanced. In general,
countries with stronger currencies are
penalized to the benefit of countries with
weak currencies. This problem can only be
overcome if monetary and exchange rate
policies are harmonized. It does not seem
likely, however, that countries would give
up an important element of their autono-
mous national policies. Instead, interna-
tional prices denominated in U.S. dollars
could be used, but this would not capture
all the potential benefits from integration,
which demands strict control of all border
transactions. Moreover, partner countries
would have to agree to use international
prices for intraregional trade.
A transition period is needed during
which the conditions necessary for a com-
plete liberalization of trade among the
SADCC countries can be initiated. This
more modest goal is actually the strategy
that the SADCC countries are following.
"We believe that there is room for sub-
stantial increases in trade among ourselves.
To this end existing payment systems and
customs instruments will be studied in
order to build up a regional trade system
based on bilaterally negotiated annual trade
targets and product lists," declared the
SADCC heads of state at their first meeting
in Lusaka in April 1980.
7
2 The long-stand-
ing Mozambique-Tanzania trade agree-




1 The Preferential Trade Agreement among the Eastern and Southern African countries asks for a clearing of the
imbalances in hard currencies.
72 Quoted in Hanlon, SADCC: Progress, Projects, and Prospects, p. 70.
64vance on the amount of trade and a range
of products, working out the details during
the year, serves as a model. Thus, trade
relations are based on bilateralism and coun-
tertrade in the form of counterpurchase,
where countries have to sell to each other
the same value of products. Are trade rela-
tions of this type a move toward efficient
market integration?
It is certainly true that bilateral counter-
purchase efficiently serves two functions.
First, by definition, trade is balanced on an
annual basis. This seems to avoid balance-of-
payments problems, but it is questionable.
Second, bilateral counterpurchase helps
provide information about market condi-
tions in the trading partner's home markets;
by setting up communication channels, nec-
essary conditions for efficient trade expan-
sion are created. Moreover, it may be argued
that multilateral trade relations, although
desirable, are not feasible because of bal-
ance-of-payments constraints. Therefore, bi-
lateral counterpurchase may only be a sec-
ond-best solution for generating welfare in
the trading partner's country. Unfortu-
nately, it can also decrease welfare and wor-
sen the balance of payments.
It is obvious that counterpurchase is
only chosen because foreign exchange mar-
kets are not in equilibrium. In reality, do-
mestic currencies are overvalued if a mul-
tilateral opening of the economy is rejected.
However, given this condition, bilateral pur-
Table 23—Hypothetical comparison of exchange rates and prices under







































































































Source: Author's calculations based on a hypothetical example.
Notes: This hypothetical example is based on the Tanzanian shilling (TSh) for country A and the Mozambique
metical (Mt) for country B.
65chase trade may give rise to trade flows that
do not correspond to differences in the
countries' comparative advantage. Table 23
helps clarify this.
Two countries, Tanzania (A) and Mo-
zambique (B), are compared hypothetically.
The crucial assumption is that the Tanza-
nian shilling (TSh) and the Mozambique
metical (Mt) are overvalued but at different
degrees. The shadow exchange rate of the
shilling is assumed to be 24 against the U.S.
dollar, but the official rate is TSh 20 for U.S.
$1. The overvaluation of the metical is as-
sumed to be greater; an official exchange
rate of Mt 40 against the U.S. dollar stands
against a shadow exchange rate of Mt 56
for U.S. $ 1. Given the official exchange rates
and given prices for the three products in
the two countries, country A would export
products 1 and 2 and import product 3.
However, if product prices are compared
on the basis of the shadow exchange rates,
country A would not be able to export any
of the products; instead, it would import
products 1 and 3, and no trade would result
for product 2. This example clearly shows
that trade flows under counterpurchase
agreements but distorted exchange rates
may give rise to a different trade pattern
than under free trade conditions.
Moreover, two significant additional ef-
fects may arise. First, the foreign exchange
situation will deteriorate for some trading
partners and improve for others. If, for
example, country B has to import product
1, even though it actually has a comparative
advantage over country A, it is worse off
than if it produced product 1 and sold it on
the world market. Second, it can easily be
seen that counterpurchase trade, even if it
leads to balanced trade between the part-
ners, will nevertheless induce income trans-
fers. If country A sells product 1 and 2 to
country B at a total value of TSh 1 million
and buys product 3 from country B for TSh
1 million or Mt 2 million at official exchange
rates, it has actually sold products at a value
of U.S. $41,667 at shadow exchange rates
and received a product value of U.S.
$35,714 at shadow exchange rates. Thus
country A transferred an income of U.S.
$5,953—14 percent of its export value—to
country B. This clearly shows that counter-
purchase agreements will necessarily result
in distorted trade patterns and uneven trans-
fer effects. Thus, it is not at all guaranteed
that trade expansion will be to the mutual
benefit of all countries. It is even question-
able whether the region as a whole will
benefit from trade expansion.
Therefore, one must conclude that this
intraregional trade strategy is not economi-
cally efficient and is not likely to be viable.
If the SADCC countries wish to expand
intraregional trade without liberalizing the
exchange rate regimes, there seems to be
only one solution. As national prices, equa-
lized at official exchange rates, cannot lead
to a rational intraregional trade pattern,
world market prices denominated in U.S.
dollars should be used to value exports and
imports. At first glance, this may appear
cumbersome and infeasible. However, be-
cause trade flows are negotiated between
governmental institutions or parastatals, it
may serve as a first step toward liberalizing
the exchange rate regimes.
66ALTERNATIVE REGIONAL COOPERATION





To improve food security, the SADCC
countries have considered setting up a re-
gional stockpiling system for grains. Is there
a rationale for such a scheme? If so, what
are the expected benefits, and what should
be the institutional framework for exploit-
ing them?
It is indisputable that national and re-
gional stocks can contribute to food security.
Because there are other means of accom-
plishing the same objective, however, it is
not certain that stocks should be the main
instrument. Other instruments available in-
clude trade accompanied by foreign exchange
reserves.
7
3 In Chapter 6 it was argued that
trade can substitute for stocks, at least in
part. Hence, whether stocks are needed to
stabilize consumption and what level of stocks
should be chosen largely depends on the
trade regime that is applied. The optimal
level of stocks will be lower if a more liberal
trade regime prevails. However, countries
may be reluctant to liberalize trade in agri-
cultural products for political reasons. Given
a political constraint, SADCC countries would
be better off establishing a regional stockpil-
ing system for grains, if expected benefits
are sufficiently high and if the functioning
of the system does not demand the loss of
national autonomy in dispersing food.
Holding stock may serve several pur-
poses. Stocks held to guarantee a continuous
flow of consumption over time by bridging
gaps caused by time lags or unreliable infor-
mation in situations where policies have to
be devised to meet short-term targets are
called working stocks. Working stocks may
be fairly small and should not be a concern
of public policy if the marketing system
functions well and marketing is performed
by private traders. Neither condition is ful-
filled in the SADCC countries. As six of the
nine countries are landlocked, foreign sup-
ply is not always quickly available. Hence,
working stocks may be needed to bridge the
time lags when foreign supply is unexpec-
tedly delayed. Apart from this, working
stocks are of public concern in the SADCC
countries because the regional supply re-
sponse to shortages is slow, to some extent
because trade in staple foods is performed
by public or parastatal institutions.
It is obvious that regional cooperation
could help reduce the amount of national
working stocks held against the risk of de-
layed delivery from outside the region. Ac-
tually, working stocks held for this reason
might be unnecessary if individual countries
had access to regional carryover stocks in
cases of delayed delivery, although they
should be obliged to replace borrowed
stocks after the delivery arrives. Thus, re-
gional carryover stocks could, as a by-prod-
uct, reduce the size of national working
stocks.
Regional carryover stocks may be con-
sidered a rational policy from an economic
point of view if, first, the rationale for na-
tional carryover stocks can be proven and
if regional carryover stocks can be smaller
7
3 John Mclntire, Food Security in the Sahel: Variable Import Levy, Grain Reserves, and Foreign Exchange
Assistance, Research Report 26 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1981).
67than the sum of national carryover stocks;
or second, if there is no rationale for national
carryover stocks, but nevertheless there is
one for regional stocks.
It is widely believed in developing coun-
tries that national carryover stocks are
needed to guarantee food security, but this
view is not shared by some researchers in
developed countries. For tradable com-
modities, such as wheat and yellow maize,
Shlomo Reutlinger et al. find that the cost
of a reserve usually exceeds its benefits;
trade seems to be most effective in meeting
the food security objective.
7
4 These find-
ings, which are based on the assumption
that countries are risk neutral, are con-
firmed by D. Gale Johnson.
7
5 John Mclntire
finds that in the Sahel food reserves can
only be justified in exceptional cases in land-
locked countries where severe transport
constraints exist.
7
6 In spite of these research
results, governments of developing coun-
tries express concern about adequate carry-
over stocks, although strictly speaking these
could often be classified as working stocks,
or they may entail holding stocks of com-
modities that are virtually untradable, such
as white maize.
It should be clear, however, that car-
ryover stocks alone are not adequate. If a
government tries to guarantee food security
through reserve stocks alone—with no de-
pendence on trade—these stocks would
have to be prohibitively large because of the
stochastic nature of domestic production
and of world market prices. Even though
the probability is small, it cannot be ruled
out that there could be extremely bad har-
vests and extremely high world market
prices for several years in a row. No society
is likely to be willing to accept high storage
costs and real income forgone in order to
be insured against such an unlikely series
of events. This clearly indicates that there
is a trade-off between the degree of food
security and the costs of achieving it, not
only for carryover stocks as an instrument,
but for all other policies to achieve this ob-
jective as well.
Risk is a crucial consideration in evaluat-
ing alternative policies. One alternative is
to consider the governments or societies of
developing countries as risk-neutral. In this
case, the evaluation should be based on ex-
pected values, which implies that carryover
stockholding can only be profitable at a point
in time when the price differential between
expected export or import prices and pres-
ent export or import prices is larger than
storage costs. That such a solution will arise
in most developing countries is unlikely. If
price expectations were the same for all
countries, stocks would be held in those
countries where storage costs are the low-
est, that is, in exporting countries. It can
be expected that the price differential be-
tween expected and present world market
prices is likely to be higher than storage
costs for developed countries than for de-
veloping importing countries. Thus, there
may be a need to hold working stocks—pos-
sibly large ones—but there seems to be no
rationale for holding carryover stocks of
tradable commodities in developing coun-
tries.
It should be noted that the derived con-
ditions for expected profitability of national
carryover stocks implicitly state the irrele-
vance of fluctuations in domestic production
for profitable storage. If storage planning is
based on expected values, fluctuations in
domestic production can only be a deter-
minant of the amount of stocks held if the
country under consideration switches from
being a net importer to being a net exporter
as production fluctuates. This would have
an impact on the differential between the
present and expected world market price,
where the present world market price is
the country's f.o.b. price and the expected
7
4 Shlomo Reutlinger, David Eaton, and David Bigman, Should Developing Nations Carry Grain Reserves? World
Bank Staff Working Paper 244 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1976).
7
5 D. Gale Johnson, "Grain Insurance, Reserves, and Trade," p. 255.
7
6 Mclntire, Food Security in the Sahel.
68world market price is the c.i.f. price. Be-
cause there is a wide differential between
export and import prices, especially for land-
locked Eastern African countries, however,
it seems rational to relate stocking up and
release of stocks to domestic production out-
comes.
This finding has implications for assess-
ing the benefits of regional cooperation in
planning carryover stocks. If, as this report
has shown, production is more stable on
the regional than on the national level, the
probability of a switch from a surplus to a
deficit situation could be higher for nations
than for regions. Therefore, the sum of un-
coordinated national carryover stocks should
probably be higher than the amount of carry-
over stocks held under an integrated re-
gional scheme. There is, then, a rationale
for integrating national stocks where gov-
ernments and societies are risk-neutral, but
there is also some evidence that developing
countries are risk-averse.
If countries are risk-averse, it may be
rational to hold some carryover stocks even
when the differential between expected and
present world market prices does not cover
storage costs. Any other alternative for se-
curing food in the future is more risky if
there are severe limitations to having rapid
access to capital markets. A country can
compare alternative risk-reducing strate-
gies, which might include reserves of for-
eign exchange or reserve stocks. With any
of the alternatives, society incurs a loss in
present consumption in order to secure a
certain level of future consumption. How-
ever, a specific loss in consumption at pres-
ent leads to varying levels of consumption
in the future, depending on the risk-reduc-
ing strategy chosen and the outcome of the
stochastic variables—world market prices
and domestic production.
For the sake of simplicity, assume that
a country aims at guaranteeing cereal con-
sumption x in period t,. This could be done
by building up grain reserves to x in period
t^. Consumption forgone in period to is x.
Alternatively, foreign exchange reserves
could be built up in period to, which would
allow purchase of the quantity needed in
period tj. It is not certain, however, that
the amount of foreign exchange needed to
buy quantity x in period to will still buy
quantity x in period t]. The outcome de-
pends on the prevailing world market price
in period t,, which is unknown in period
to. It may well be that by holding foreign
exchange reserves the present income for-
gone may be less than if grain reserves were
held. Because actual world market prices
may differ considerably from expected ones,
however, food supply is less secure in period
t, if exchange reserves are held. On the
other hand, if enough foreign exchange re-
serves are held to allow purchase of quantity
x even under extreme world market condi-
tions, the amount of foreign exchange held
would have to be much higher than the
amount needed to buy quantity x in period
t0. The two alternatives may lead to different
risks and different values of expected con-
sumption in period t,.
If carryover stocks were chosen, there
would be no risk involved. The foreign ex-
change strategy would lead to a higher ex-
pected value of consumption but also to the
acceptance of some risk. If the country's
risk preferences are not known, it is impos-
sible to rank the alternatives.
Of course, this does not mean that food
reserves should be considered superior to
foreign exchange reserves. Without a clear
ranking, it only helps explain that food re-
serves can contribute efficiently to food
availability. Actually, the premium that has
to be paid to cover the risk of a reduction
in the expected value of future consumption
may be quite high. A portfolio of risk-reduc-
ing alternatives might be a better way to
secure food availability. Even if the optimum
portfolio cannot be determined without
knowing the country's risk-aversion parame-
ter, the trade-off for policymakers can be
analyzed.
Risk-aversion not only rationalizes na-
tional carryover stocks, it also argues for
regional cooperation in stockpiling. If the
risk of production shortfalls coinciding with
high unexpected world market prices is less
on the regional than the national level, co-
operation in regional stockpiling may be a
rational strategy. The next step is to quantify
possible gains.
69Quantifying the Potential
Benefits of a Regional
Food Reserve
It should be kept in mind that there is
no single measure of actual benefits and
costs of any regional food reserve system.
The ultimate objective is to calculate the
expected benefits and costs for the SADCC
region as a whole and for individual coun-
tries. A regional food reserve may function
as a regional insurance system against short-
falls in food consumption. Actual benefits
and costs may differ considerably from their
expected values, as is the case for any insur-
ance system.
National expected benefits and costs of
a regional food reserve system may differ
depending on the size of the reserves and
the related question of the agreed-upon
rules that allow individual countries to with-
draw food from the regional stock and deter-
mine when stocks have to be replenished.
Two alternatives are presented. First, it
is assumed that the region aims to compen-
sate for regional fluctuations in production
by changing regional stocks. This strategy
implies that the region is not willing to rely
on world markets to compensate for fluctu-
ations in the region's production through
variances in import volumes. This strategy,
however, does not help stabilize the food
import bill because regional stocks and thus
import volumes are not related to fluctua-
tions in import prices. Therefore, food secu-
rity may not be achieved when import prices
are high. Hence, the region may pursue a
regional stockpiling system aimed at stabil-




To date, researchers have quantified re-
gional food reserves for the ASEAN coun-
tries
7
7 and the SADCC countries.
7
8 Al-
though quite divergent in some aspects, all
these studies start with one crucial assump-
tion: regional reserves should compensate
for fluctuations in regional production. This
implies that the region would import only
the difference between trend consumption
and production. Conjunctural deficits or
surpluses, which are defined as deviations
from trend production because of crop
shortfalls or other contingencies, should be
reflected in changes in the regional re-
serves. Technosynesis calculated that 1.42
million tons of nonintegrated national stocks
would be needed in 1985, whereas only
0.7 million tons of regional stocks—less
than half—would be required.
7
9 Thus the
gains from regional reserves could be large.
Whether these gains actually materialize de-
pends on the rules set up for release and
replenishment of stocks and whether they
can be enforced.
A regional food reserve to even out the
region's fluctuations in production is not
the most efficient way to achieve food secu-
rity. Its contribution could be marginal or
even negative. As already explained, both
production and import prices may fluctuate,
impairing food security. If the coefficient of
correlation between fluctuations in produc-
tion and in world market prices were +1
and both fluctuations were the same, fluctu-
ations in domestic production would not
impair food security. A shortfall in produc-
tion could be offset by an increase in imports
without affecting the food import bill.
7
7 S. Hanpongpandh, "Modelling the Impact of the ASEAN Food Security Reserve," in Food Security: Theory,
Policy, and Perspectives from Asia and the Pacific Rim, ed. A. Chrisholm and R. Tyers (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington
Books, 1982), p. 281; S. Hanpongpandh and L Blakeslee, "Rice Marketing Analysis: ASEAN Reserve Stock
Model," in Agricultural Development in Thailand, ed. K. J. Nicol, S. Srlplung, and E. O. Heady (Ames, Iowa:
Iowa State University Press, 1982), p. 164; R. Phillips and D. Jeon, "Simulating the Impact of Alternative Food
Reserve Programs: The ASEAN Case," Journal of Rural Development $ (April 1980): 83; and R. Byung-Seo, R.
Phillips, and P. R. Kelly, "Feasibility of Food Security Reserves for Korea," Journal of Rural Development 5
(December 1980): 197.
7
8 Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Regional Food Security Programme, "Regional Food
Reserve."
7
9 Ibid., p. 21.
70Hence, it is reasonable to assume that it is
not fluctuations in production but fluctua-
tions in the food import bill that present
the food security problem. Using this specifi-
cation, it is easy to determine what condi-
tions must prevail for the food import bill
to be more stable.
8
0
Table 24 presents the results of the cal-
culations for the SADCC countries, which
are based on actual cereal imports. For six
out of the nine countries, fluctuations in
import volumes were negatively correlated
with fluctuations in import prices, which
indicates that countries did somewhat ad-
just their import volumes to changes in im-
port prices. But if they had imported the
actual volumes at trend prices during the
period, the variability in the import bill
would have still been significant. For the
other three countries, the import bill would
have varied more with trend prices.
Actual variations in import volumes may
have arisen partly from fluctuations in do-
mestic production and partly from variations
in import prices. If adjustment in import
volumes to variability in import prices were
not compensated for by changes in domestic
stocks, consumption would have varied and
food security would have been weakened.
For the calculations of the hypothetical im-
port bill in Table 24, it is assumed that coun-
tries vary their import volumes or stocks to
offset variations in domestic cereal produc-
tion around the trend to stabilize domestic
consumption at trend values. Thus annual
consumption would be equal to the trend
value of consumption, and the import bill
with stabilization would vary considerably
more than the actual import bill. This indi-
cates that countries do not relate cereal im-
ports to fluctuations in domestic cereal pro-
duction completely. Instead, they may hold
national stocks to even out fluctuations in
supply, or they may accept some variability
in consumption.
It may seem surprising that the food im-
port bill that would maintain trend con-
sumption in all years would be more volatile
for SADCC than for the individual countries.
Because some of the countries are only mar-
ginal importers or even exporters of cereals
in normal years, small fluctuations in do-
mestic production will result in relatively
large fluctuations in import volumes. The
higher variability of the cereal import bill
for SADCC than for any country does not
indicate that regional cooperation to stabi-
lize the import bill would not pay, however.
It is just the opposite. The region's food
import bill is highly volatile because the
region is almost self-sufficient, and individ-
ual countries produce either a surplus or a
greater relative deficit than the region. On
this basis, regional cooperation would be
advisable.
The results indicate that a stockpiling
rule that only takes into account fluctuations
in domestic production would have reduced
instability in the food import bill, but the
stabilizing effect is less than perfect and
varies among countries. Hence, a storage
rule that relates changes in stocks to
changes in production alone is not an ade-
quate means of coping with the instability
problem.
Such a storage system implies that indi-
vidual member countries will draw from the
regional stock if production is below the
trend value. Other countries whose produc-
tion is above the trend value will have to
replenish it. Instead, the Technosynesis
consultants proposed that individual coun-
tries drawing from stocks in one period
would replenish in the following period.
However, this rule would not guarantee that
changes in the regional stock would be re-
lated to the region's fluctuations in produc-
tion. But this was assumed when the size
of the regional stock and its benefits were
calculated.
It is unlikely that individual countries
would be willing to adhere to the proposed
rule. Assuming there is a production short-
fall in country A, a bumper crop in country
B, and world market prices are extraordinar-
ily high, country A would, of course, want
to draw from the regional stock, but country
B may not be willing to replenish the stock.
8
0 Stabilization of import volumes will actually contribute to decreasing the variability in the food import bill if
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72If country B has been a food importer every
year, it will want to help stabilize its food
bill by importing less than normal in times
of high world market prices. Rebuilding re-
gional stocks when world market prices are
high would place a burden on country B,
and it would not constitute sound economic
management. The system would reward
country A at a cost to country B. Such dis-
tributional effects would probably lead to
tension among the cooperating countries.
In summary, it is neither rational nor
feasible from the economic point of view to
relate the region's food reserve to fluctua-
tions in the region's production alone.
Compensating for Instability
in the Food Import Bill
A regional food reserve designed to sta-
bilize the food import bills of the region and
individual countries could be an efficient
way to reduce risk. The amount of beginning
stocks needs to be determined and the rules
for a proper functioning specified.
Technosynesis estimated the amount of
stocks needed if their proposed storage rule
were applied by assuming that the same
sequence of deviations from the trend of
production will prevail in the future. An
assumption about the relationship between
past and future fluctuations is needed but,
contrary to Technosynesis, it is not assumed
here that the same sequence of deviations
will prevail. Instead it is only assumed that
the variance of fluctuations will not change
over time. The sequence of positive and
negative deviations from the trend value of
food imports cannot be predicted, but the
expected sum of the negative values of the
random disturbances can be calculated if
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where
E(S) = expected sum of shortfalls,
u = deviation from the trend,
o- = standard deviation, and
n = number of years for which a short-
fall could be compensated.
The following steps are taken. First, the
food import bill needed to stabilize national
trend consumption is calculated. Second,
the standard deviations of fluctuation
around the trend of the food import bill—on
the national and regional levels—are calcu-
lated. Third, the expected sum of shortfalls
in foreign exchange over a period of 10
years is specified. This implies that reserves
would be large enough to compensate for
fluctuations in the import bill for 10 years.
And fourth, the sum of shortfalls in foreign
exchange is translated into the quantity of
cereals needed for a food reserve. This is
done by dividing the expected sum of short-
falls in the food import bill by the average
trend value of cereal import prices. The re-
sults are reported in Table 25. The stocks
that would have stabilized the food import
bill and simultaneously trend cereal con-
sumption vary considerably among the nine
SADCC countries. The sum of noninte-
grated national stocks would amount to 3.3
million tons, but regional stocks would need
to be only 1.9 million tons—41 percent less.
This could lead to savings of about U.S. $55
million.
Stocks held to compensate for fluctua-
tions in the cereal import bill are generally
larger than stocks that are held to compen-
sate for fluctuations in cereal production be-
cause the import bill varies more than cereal
production. The relationship between vari-
ability in production and import volumes
can be derived easily. Consumption (C),
which is to be stabilized, is by definition
equal to production (Q) and imports (M).
, (13) C = Q + M. (14)
8
1 L. M. Goreux, "Compensatory Financing for Fluctuations in the Costs of Cereal Imports," in Food Security for
Developing Countries, ed. Alberto Valdes (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1981), p. 315.


































































Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO): for total cereal production, 1961-80, "Production Yearbook Tapes," Rome, various years; for cereal
imports, 1966-80, and for border prices, FAO, "Trade Yearbook Tapes," Rome, various years.
Notes: The import bill is hypothetical. The estimate for storage costs is $50.00 per metric ton per year. Based
on these calculations, holding regional stocks to compensate for production shortfall would save 41.0
percent or U.S. $41.3 million, whereas those held to compensate for an import bill shortfall would save
41.2 percent or U.S. $67.8 million.
" Export revenues.
If C is to be stabilized, the variance of M
has to be equal to the variance of Q. Thus,
var (Q) = var (M), (15)
and
CV(M) = (Q/M)CV(Q). (16)
As Q is much greater than M for all coun-
tries, the coefficient of variation of import
volumes will always be greater than the
coefficient of variation of production. This
is especially true for countries, such as
Malawi, that are almost self-sufficient.
It should be kept in mind that the level
of stocks needed, as calculated in this exer-
cise, would completely compensate for fluc-
tuations in the food import bill through
changes in stocks. This implies that govern-
ments have a highly risk-averse attitude. A
government may prefer to take care of fluc-
tuations in the food import bill through re-
serves of both food and foreign exchange.
This would lead to a higher expected value
of consumption but would be more risky.
As the risk aversion of individual govern-
ments is unknown, the grain reserves calcu-
lated represent an upper limit.
Implementation of a Regional
Food Reserve System
A regional food reserve system could be
implemented without impairing the auton-
omy of the individual countries in pursuing
food policy. However, countries have to
agree on the beginning level of regional
stocks, on cost sharing, and on rules for
releasing and replenishing stocks.
The level of beginning stocks depends
on the extent to which individual countries
prefer to be insured against shortfalls in
foreign exchange to finance the food import
bill by holding food reserves. It is likely that
interests will diverge as the consequence of
different aversions to risk and because of
different costs for alternative stabilizing
policies. For example, those countries that
can easily substitute cassava for cereal con-
74sumption or that have less binding foreign
exchange constraints will probably not see
the need to stabilize cereal consumption to-
tally. Hence, they may be willing to accept
some deficit in the food import bill at times
of high world market prices or domestic
production shortfalls. For this reason, coun-
tries should be allowed to select the extent
to which they want to be insured. If a coun-
try, for example, chooses to be insured by
only 80 percent, it would receive only 80
percent of a deficit in food imports. Con-
sequently, the total amount of beginning
stocks could be decreased if some countries
opt for less insurance.
8
2
It is crucial that the costs of holding
regional stocks be shared adequately if the
regional reserve scheme is to be viable.
Some of the starting capital could be funded
by external resources, especially by the EC
in accordance with the Lom6 agreement.
The remaining start-up costs and current
costs should be paid by member countries
in proportion to expected benefits. If all
countries want to be insured completely,
cost sharing could be based on the ratio of
nonintegrated national stocks of an individ-
ual country over the sum of nonintegrated
national stocks of all nine countries. If a
country wants to be insured by x percent,
the country's share in costs should be re-
duced proportionally. In addition, it should
be taken into consideration that total stocks
needed would be smaller. A cost sharing
formula would be:




share in total costs of country i,
storage needed if country i would
carry out an autonomous storage
policy to cover the risk completely,
storage needed to cover completely
the risk of all countries using a non-
integrated stockpiling system, and
x, = percentage of insurance that a coun-
try selects.
If X; were 1 for all countries, or if all coun-
tries wanted to be insured against shortfalls
in the food import bill to the same extent,
costs would be based on the ratio of the
individual country's national autonomous
stocks and their sum. The proposed formula
for sharing in costs could guarantee that the
benefits of the scheme could be distributed
evenly among the member countries.
The table below shows the cost shares
when all countries prefer to be insured com-
pletely based on the data in Table 25. Those
countries that need only small amounts of
national stocks to stabilize the national ce-
real food import bill autonomously would
only have to pay a small fraction of the total
storage costs for the regional scheme. These
are countries that either produce a small
share of the region's cereals, such as Bot-
swana, Lesotho, and Swaziland, or those
that have less variability in cereal produc-
tion, such as Angola and Tanzania. Zim-
babwe would pay the largest share because
its 25 percent share in the region's cereal
production is the highest and its variability






















Countries will probably be prepared to
share in the costs if they can agree upon
the rules for release and replenishment of
stocks. To clarify the rules for release with
a schematic example, assume that the trend
8
2 The idea of an insurance approach for improving food security is well presented by Panos Konandreas, Barbara
Huddleston, and Virabongsa Ramangkura, Food Security: An Insurance Approach, Research Report 4 (Washington,
D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1978).
75value of country I's import bill in year t is
$150,000 for the quantity expected to be
imported. That is, the trend value of import
volume in year t is 1,000 tons and the ex-
pected price is $150 per ton. If the country
experiences an unexpected shortfall in ce-
real production of 100 tons, the country
would have to import 1,100 tons in year t
in order to stabilize cereal consumption.
However, if the import price happens to be
$165, the trend value of the import bill
would allow the country to import only 909
tons. Hence, the country would suffer a
shortfall of 191 tons, which could be with-
drawn from the regional reserve if the coun-
try had chosen to be completely insured.
Otherwise, the country could withdraw
only Xi x 191 tons.
It is evident that countries interested in
withdrawing reserves would be likely to
adhere to the stock release rules. They
might be less inclined to accept the rules
for replenishment. If the reserve system
functions as a genuine insurance system, in-
dividual countries should not be required
to replenish the stocks they have withdrawn.
Instead, those countries with a surplus in
their food import bill in a given year from
low world market prices or bumper crops
should help replenish the carryover stocks.
This implies that some countries may be
required to replenish stocks in a sequence
of years even if they have not drawn from
the regional stock.
If countries are not willing to agree to
this rule and instead enforce a rule that only
those countries that have drawn from the
stock must replenish it in years when they
have a surplus in their food import bill, the
system could also function. However, even
if the insurance effect was the same in the
long run, it is likely that the level of regional
stocks under this rule would not be suffi-
cient. Hence, the cost-saving effect of the
regional scheme would be less.
Of course, a regional reserve system can
only function adequately if every country in
the cooperation scheme has easy access to
reserves. This is only possible if regional
stocks are held in locations scattered through-
out the region. Technosynesis calculated
where the stocks should be held and in what
amounts. Hence, this problem can be con-
sidered to be adequately solved and need
not be investigated further in this report.
Variability in Food
Consumption and Production
As stated above, variability in food con-
sumption is mainly caused by variability in
household income. Variability in farm in-
come is mainly caused by variability in agri-
cultural production and prices. It may well
be that variability in the production of indi-
vidual agricultural products is largely deter-
mined by adverse weather conditions and
is beyond policy control. Nevertheless, in-
stability can partly be reduced by appro-
priately adjusting the production pattern.
Individual crops are affected differently by
weather conditions, and there may be nega-
tive covariances in the fluctuations of indi-
vidual crops. Negative covariances between
product prices may also indicate that the
variability in the value of agricultural pro-
duction may be affected by the production
pattern. In the following it is assumed that
the production pattern can be affected by
policy measures, thus decreasing instability
in the value of agricultural production.
Many developing countries prefer to pro-
duce more food than export crops if instabil-
ity can be decreased. This strategy is pur-
sued even if it means forgoing income.
If a trade-off between instability and in-
come actually exists, it can be hypothesized
that the relationship is different for individ-
ual countries than for a group of countries.
It can be expected that the larger the number
of products the more stable the value of
production will be. The risk of a failure in
individual crops and fluctuations in prices
will be diversified. It is more likely that
fluctuations in the production and prices of
one product will be offset by compensating
variations in other products.
In carrying out the empirical calcula-
tions the relevant price for measuring the
value of agricultural production has to be
defined. It is not relevant how the producer
perceives instability. Actually, it maybe that
producers are not affected by price instabil-
76ity if the government runs price stabilization
schemes. But, for the economy as a whole,
prices will nevertheless be unstable. A
measure of price instability from a sectoral
point of view is needed. In the following
calculations the export or import prices of
a country or region are used to value produc-
tion. These prices are adequate because
they express opportunity costs from an eco-
nomic point of view.
The results of the calculations are pre-
sented in Table 26. First, they indicate that
the variability in the value of production
varies considerably among products. Sugar
and sisal production are most volatile. Sec-
ond, instability in the value of cereal produc-
tion is relatively high for all countries, but
significantly less than for sisal and sugar.
Third, four out of the nine countries
produce more than one noncereal export
crop. The variability in the value of total
production was generally lower than the in-
stability in the value of cereal production if
the production pattern included several
noncereal export crops. The only exception
is Mozambique, where noncereal crop pro-
duction is quite unstable. According to these
results, an increase in export crop produc-
tion may help stabilize sectoral income. This
effect will arise if the values of production
for individual crops are negatively corre-
lated with each other, and if fluctuations in
the value of production are independent.
Fourth, the variability of the three vari-
ables, the values of cereal production, non-
cereal export crop production, and total pro-
duction, is smaller for SADCC than for indi-
vidual countries. This lends further support
to the idea of regional risk-pooling, which
is smaller for two reasons. First, individual
crops vary less on the regional than on the
national level, and second, variability in the
value of total production tends to be less,
the more diversified the production pattern.
It is tempting to recommend policy ac-
tions on the basis of these results. However,
the following reservations hold: in deriving
a formula for the "optimal" shares it must
be assumed that the coefficient of variation
for the value of a given crop will not change
with the share of this production value in
the value of total production. This implies
that the variability in production is only
caused by the variability of yields and not
of area harvested.
8
3 This can be considered
a reasonable assumption for most crops;
however, an expansion of cultivated area
may lead to higher instability for some
crops. This will certainly happen if an in-
creasing part of production is grown in areas
that are more prone to unstable yields due
to specific soil and climate conditions. Be-
cause these consequences cannot be ob-
served from the macroeconomic data pre-
sented above, direct policy recommenda-
tions cannot be made. However, the find-
ings are sufficient to recommend that indi-
vidual governments should investigate
whether a change in the production pattern
along the lines of the results presented
above is feasible.
The same recommendation applies to a
change in the regional production pattern.
However, an additional problem will arise
concerning the linkage between national
and regional instability. A change in the
production pattern would affect national in-
stability in the country under consideration,
but it would not necessarily affect instability
in other countries in the region. This might
happen to some extent if the countries in
the region were to integrate their markets.
An alternative would be to create a regional





Food insecurity arises not only from fluctu-
ations in production and food import prices,
but also from fluctuations in real income
8
3 The formula is based on the assumption that only yields are stochastic, not area harvested. Moreover, it is
assumed that fluctuations among Individual crops are independent. For the derivation of this formula, see Ulrich
Koester, Policy Options/or the Grain Economy of the European Community: Implications for Developing Countries,
Research Report 35 (Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1982), p. S3.
































































Source: Author's calculations based on data from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
(FAO): for cereal production, 1961-80, FAO, "Production Yearbook Tapes," Rome, various years; other
production data from FAO, Production Yearbook (Rome: FAO, various years); for the cereal Import bill
1961-80, from FAO, "Trade Yearbook Tapes," Rome, various years; and for other prices from FAO, Trade
Yearbook (Rome: FAO, various years).
Notes: The ellipses indicate that production was negligible. The figures are corrected coefficients of variation,








4 Hence, it is not cer-
tain that stabilizing food supply through a
regional stockpiling system will definitely
contribute to food security. It cannot be
taken for granted that measures applied di-
rectly to the food markets will actually sta-
bilize real income and thus food consump-
tion. Variability in real income in develop-
ing countries is mainly caused by fluctua-
tions in export earnings and in the food
import bill. Hence, "the food insecurity
problem of developing countries should be




could be stabilized by stabilizing total export
earnings and the food import bill or by
stabilizing net export earnings (defined as
total export earnings minus the value of food
imports). If countries are not totally risk-
averse they could complement a food reserve
system with a foreign exchange stabilization
scheme.
It can be argued that a regional foreign
exchange stabilization scheme is hardly
needed, as there are already two schemes,
the IMF and STABEX, which are supposed
to stabilize export earnings and the food
import bill of developing countries. How-
ever, past experience has shown that these
schemes are not sufficient for the task. On
the basis of his calculations for the IMF ex-
port earnings stabilization scheme, Herrmann
concludes, "For the aggregate of payments
and repayments in the IMF system, it was
8
4 Vaktes and Siamwalla, "Introduction."
8
5 Alberto Valde's and Panos Konandreas, "Assessing Food Insecurity Based on National Aggregates in Developing
Countries," in Food Security for Developing Countries, ed. Alberto Valde's (Boulder, Colo.: Westvlew Press,
1981), p. 41.
78not possible ... to prove stabilizing or de-
stabilizing effects at the 1 percent level."
8
6
Similar conclusions can be drawn for the
STABEX system. It is obvious that the two
schemes have not been able to reduce insta-
bility significantly for most countries if they
have had any stabilizing effect at all. Con-
sequently, there may be a need for a regional
scheme, which, however, should not be
considered a substitute for the present
schemes but a complement. Apart from
their stabilization effects, both the IMF and
the STABEX systems transfer income to
those countries that draw from the fund.
Hence SADCC countries could obtain in-
come by using the funds' facilities, and in
addition they could further stabilize foreign
exchanges through a regional scheme.
A regional scheme can only be recom-
mended if net export earnings—as defined
above—fluctuate less regionally than na-
tionally. According to Table 27, this holds
true if the coefficient of variation is accepted
as an adequate measure.
What funds are needed for a foreign ex-
change stabilization scheme and how such
a system could function has been described




The nine Southern and Eastern African
countries that decided to cooperate in 1980
are all relatively small. The total population
is only about 60 million. It can be expected
that cooperation among such small coun-
tries may result in higher benefits than
among large countries. Moreover, six of
these nine countries are landlocked. Hence,
transport costs for exports to markets out-
Table 27—Instability in the cereal























































side the region are high. Moreover, access
to foreign markets depends on road, rail,
and harbor facilities in neighboring coun-
tries. Thus, regional cooperation may result
in high economic returns, perhaps higher
than those resulting from unilateral liberal-
ization.
However, it should be kept in mind that
most regional cooperation schemes have not
met expectations. This does not mean that
the potential benefits were minor; it only
indicates that potential benefits are not easy
to capture. The success of a regional scheme
greatly depends on its implementation. In
this respect, regional cooperation strategies
do not differ from any other policy strategy.
Potential benefits can only be captured if
policies are adequately administered and
implemented.
8
6 Roland Herrmann, The Compensatory Financing System of the International Monetary Fund; An Analysis of
its Effects and Comparisons with Alternative Systems, Forum Reports on Current Research in Agricultural Econom-
ics and Agribusiness Management (Kiel: Kieler Wlssenschaftsverlag Vauk, 1983).
8
7 Valde's and Konandreas, "Assessing Food Insecurity."
79APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES
Table 28—Changes in the market shares of LAFTA's agricultural exports to




















Animal oils and fats
Fixed vegetable oils and fats






































































































Source: Author's calculations based on International Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC Trade Data Base,"
Washington, D.C., 1985 (computer printout).
80Table 29—Changes in the market shares of LAFTA's agricultural exports to
member countries in developing-country exports to LAFTA



















Animal oils and fats
Fixed vegetable oils and fats






































































































Source: Author's calculations based on International Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC Trade Data Base,"
Washington, D.C., 1985 (computer printout).
81Table 30—LAFTA's agricultural exports to member countries as a share of
LAFTA's exports to the world, 1962-64 to 1977-79
Commodity
Dairy products












































































































Source: Author's calculations based on International Food Policy Research Institute, "Intra-LDC Trade Data Base,"
Washington, D.C., 1985 (computer printout).

































Meat and meat preparations
Dairy products
Fish and fish preparations
Cereals
Fruits and vegetables
Sugar and sugar preparations
Coffee, tea, cocoa, and spices
Animal feed
Miscellaneous food preparations
Chemical elements and compounds




Wood and cork manufactures
Paper and paperboard












































































































Source: Karl M. Bennett, "An Evaluation of the Contribution of CARICOM to Intra-regional Caribbean Trade,"
Social and Economic Studies 31 (No. 1, 1982): 80.































































































Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Production Yearbook, vol. 36 (Rome: FAO,
1982), quoted in Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Agricultural Research Resource
Assessment in the SADCC Countries, vol. 1, Regional Analysis and Strategy, (Gaborone, Botswana:
SADCC, 1985), pp. 2-5.
* In FAO statistics, arable land refers to land under temporary crops with multiple cropped areas counted only
once, plus temporary meadows for mowing or pasture, land under market and kitchen gardens, and land temporarily
fallow or lying idle. Land under permanent crops refers to land cultivated with crops that occupy the land for
long periods such as coffee, rubber, and cocoa. It includes fruit and nut trees but excludes trees grown for wood
or timber.
b This figure includes permanent cropland.
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